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Stock-based compensation is no longer the exclusive privilege of
corporate executives. A recent survey indicated that sixty percent of
publicly traded technology companies offered stock options during the
past three years to all their employees.' A separate survey cited by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") indicated that
the percentage of major companies with stock option plans in which at
least half of their employees could participate increased from seventeen
percent in 1993 to 39.4 percent in 1999.2 Even the less dazzling results
of a survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed that
five percent of non-executive employees in publicly traded firms
received option grants in 1999. 3 In absolute numbers, estimates indicate
that nearly ten million American employees received stock options in
1999, compared with only one million in 1992.1
The proliferation of broad-based employee incentives, however,
has created a crisis for many privately held companies under an other-
wise unremarkable provision of the federal securities laws. The Com-
mission has taken the position that the over-the-counter registration
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the "Exchange
Act") can cause a privately held company to actually "go public" by
* Department of Political Science, Stanford University. J.D., New York University School
of Law; B.A. Claremont McKenna College.
1. See Am. Elecs. Ass'n, AeA Study Finds 84% of High-Tech Workers Receive Stock
Options (Aug. 14, 2002), at http://www.aeanet.org/PressRoom/prtl_081402-StockOptionsSurvey.
asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
2. See Disclosure of Equity Compensation Plan Information, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
43892 (Jan. 26, 2001).
3. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PILOT SURVEY ON THE
INCIDENCE OF STOCK OPTIONS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN 1999, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2000). The Bureau's
survey covered only stock options actually granted during the 1999 calendar year. Id. at 1.
Because stock options normally remain outstanding for several years, the actual incidence of
outstanding stock option ownership in any particular year is likely considerably larger than the
number of options granted in that year. The survey defined "publicly held" as "[a] company
whose stock is traded on an exchange and who meets certain requirements under the law to report
its financial position to the Securities and Exchange Commission." Id. By way of comparison,
similar data from 1993-1994 revealed that less than one-half of one percent of all full-time
workers (executive and non-executive) were even eligible to receive stock option grants. See id.
4. Pallavi Gogol, When Good Options Go Bad, Bus. WK., Dec. 11, 2000, at 96.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2002). The Exchange Act, which regulates transactions on securities
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granting stock options to too many employees. The Commission asserts
that a company with five hundred or more holders of employee stock
options, like a company with five hundred or more holders of common
stock, must register under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act.6 Section
12(g) registration would mean the private company would have essen-
tially the same reporting burdens as a company that had completed an
initial public offering.7
The prospect of inadvertently "going public" under the Exchange
Act by virtue of employee stock options is at best highly impractical.8
Fortunately, when Congress enacted Section 12(g), it built in explicit
and expansive exemptive authority from the requirements of that Section
to be exercised by the Commission.9 Moreover, the Commission has, to
exchanges and the over-the-counter markets, contains registration and reporting requirements for
companies meeting certain securities distribution criteria.
6. Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act provides, in part:
Every issuer which is engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business affecting
interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce shall ... within one hundred and twenty
days after the last day of its first fiscal year ... on which the issuer has total assets
exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security (other than an exempted
security) held of record by five hundred or more ... persons, register such security
by filing with the Commission a registration statement.
15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2002). Commission Rule 12g-1 under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act
increases the required registration threshold from $1 million to $10 million. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-
1 (2003) (exempting issuers form Section 12(g) "if on the last day of [such issuer's] most recent
fiscal year the issuer had total assets not exceeding $10 million").
7. Note that the number, amount, or value of the outstanding "equity securities" are not
relevant to the requirement of registration under Section 12(g). The only relevant criteria are the
number of "holders of record," the size of the issuer's assets, and the use of the so-called
"jurisdictional means." See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2002).
8. See HERBERT KRAUS, EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS AND STOCK APPRECIATION RIGHTS 6-4
(2001).
Federal registration and its consequences are too expensive an complex to be
practical for the institution of a stock option plan by a privately owned company
.... [O]f all the consequences of federal registration, the one most unacceptable to
a privately owned company would be its introduction into the system of periodic
reporting under the Exchange Act. Even a privately owned company which intends
to go public ultimately and accept those consequences is not usually prepared to do
so prematurely in connection with an employee benefit program.
Id. Undertaking an initial public offering ordinarily entails months of preparation, corporate
housekeeping, and consultation with financial advisors and attorneys, not to mention the
expenditure of considerable amounts of money. See, e.g., HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING
PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION 1-9 to -1l (1986) (estimating the cash cost of a Securities
Act IPO at $250,000 to $1,000,000). While Exchange Act registration would normally cost less
than Securities Act registration in the context of a traditional initial public offering, Exchange Act
registration is an ongoing requirement, whereas Securities Act registration is a transaction-specific
regulatory hurdle.
9. Congress provided the Commission with exemptive authority pursuant to Section 12(h) of
the Exchange Act, which provides that:
The Commission may ... exempt in whole or in part any issuer or class of issuers
1196
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a limited extent, exercised this authority with respect to employee stock
options on the application of affected issuers.' ° The problem is that the
Commission's relief is so riddled with conditions that the exemption is,
in many ways, as onerous as the registration from which the issuer is
ostensibly exempted." In effect, the Commission has, by the device of
this exemptive relief, imposed the disclosure obligations of publicly
traded companies on issuers of instruments that cannot even be traded.'"
The awkwardness of applying the securities laws to employee
incentives is not, moreover, limited to the over-the-counter registration
provisions of the Exchange Act. In fact, the Commission itself has
acknowledged, even in the context of the centerpiece of the securities
laws-registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act")-that the imposition of the full securities law apparatus on com-
pensatory arrangements is both unnecessary and unreasonably burden-
some.1 3 Accordingly, the Commission has gradually chipped away at
the literal requirements of that securities law apparatus for employee
incentives, nearly to the point of eliminating the Securities Act regula-
tion of compensatory transactions altogether.' 4 The obvious question,
therefore, is whether the Securities Act and the Exchange Act (collec-
tively, the "Acts") should apply to employee incentives at all.
The answer to this question lies in the core concept defining the
scope of the securities laws-the definition of a "security"-and is sig-
from the provisions of subsection [12(g)] ... upon such terms and conditions and
for such period as it deems necessary or appropriate, if the Commission finds, by
reason of the number of public investors, amount of trading interest in the securities,
the nature and extent of the activities of the issuer, income or assets of the issuer, or
otherwise, that such action is not inconsistent with the public interest or the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 781(h) (2002). The Commission also has a general exemptive authority with respect
to the Exchange Act as a whole pursuant to Section 36 thereof. Id. § 78ff.
10. Issuers who have, or are likely to have, over 500 holders of employee stock options may
petition the Commission for relief from the requirement of Section 12(g) registration. See Div. OF
CORP. FIN., SEC, CURRENT ISSUES AND RULEMAKING PROJECTS QUARTERLY UPDATE (Mar. 31,
2001) [hereinafter CURRENT ISSUES].
11. The Commission's exemption is conditioned on, among other things, the issuer providing
option holders with "essentially the same Exchange Act registration statement, annual report and
quarterly report information they would have received had the company registered the class of
securities under Section 12, including audited annual financial statements and unaudited quarterly
financial information, each prepared in accordance with [Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles]." Id. The process of preparing the disclosure documents mandated by the
Commission, like registration under the Exchange Act, involves substantial cash costs, including
those of independent public auditors, attorneys, and other professionals, as well as considerable
diversion of internal attention. Further, these are not one-time expenditures; the reporting
obligations of a registrant under the Exchange Act are ongoing and continual.
12. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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nificant not only in its disposition of the employee incentive issue spe-
cifically, but in implications for the scope of the securities laws
generally. The Supreme Court's definition-of-security cases reveal that
employee stock options, while the supposedly paradigmatic employee
incentive "security" instrument, may actually fall outside the category of
"security" under the principles articulated in the Supreme Court case of
Reves v. Ernst & Young.' 5 The Reves case, which was criticized for its
vagueness and generality as a specific test for instruments called
"notes,"' 6 performs slightly more acceptably in the inevitably murky and
abstract task of delimiting the outer boundaries of the term "security."
Reading Reves as a case delimiting the scope of the securities laws gen-
erally, as opposed to "notes" specifically, combines a long and disparate
line of Supreme Court cases into a unified (but not entirely satisfying)
approach to the definition of a security.
In that spirit, this article develops a synthesis of the Court's deci-
sions defining a security that, inexplicably, has eluded courts and com-
mentators in an estimated 792 decisions and 300-plus law review articles
on the subject.17 Part II of this article proceeds by introducing the term
"security" from a statutory and jurisprudential standpoint, and by illus-
trating that many of the broad-based employee incentives presently
regarded as investment contract "securities" actually fail the Supreme
Court's investment contract criteria. Part III develops the synthesis of
the Supreme Court's cases to reveal a consistent theoretical framework
for the definition of a security. This approach reveals that, under the
criteria set forth in the Reves decision, non-security treatment is appro-
priate not only for equity incentives classified as "investment contracts"
but also for some types of broad-based employee stock options. Part IV
discusses the policy implications of treating employee stock options as
non-securities and demonstrates that, in fact, non-security treatment
would not entirely remove such stock options from securities law regula-
tory coverage. Part V outlines the alternatives available to companies
15. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
16. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
17. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of Security: An Empirical Study, 25 J. CORP. L. 307,
308 (2000). Commentators are nearly unanimous on one point: the outer boundaries of the term
"security" have "remained muddy in an area otherwise distinguished for its maturity and
precision-muddy to the point that ... many financial arrangements that are basic to commerce
and industry remain in the zone of doubt." Scott FitzGibbon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition
Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 895 (1980).
Commentators often blame this "doubt" on ambiguity or mistakes the Supreme Court's decisions.
See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of
"Security": The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40
VAND. L. REV. 489, 490 (1987). For a veritable bibliography of articles lamenting the
"elusiveness" of the definition of the term "security," see Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 925 n.5 (3d ed. 1999).
[Vol. 57:11951198
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faced with the Section 12(g) exemptive ultimatum. Part VI concludes
by offering some illuminating historical context on the relationship
among stock options, promissory notes, and functional securities regula-
tion under the Acts.
II. EMPLOYEE INCENTIVES OR "INVESTMENT CONTRACTS"?
A. Orientation to the Definition of a Security
As might be suspected, the starting point in ascertaining the appli-
cability of the federal securities laws is the definition of the term "secur-
ity." The Securities Act, which sets forth the registration and prospectus
delivery requirements of the securities laws, provides that "unless the
context otherwise requires," a "security" means:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign cur-
rency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.18
The Exchange Act, which sets forth the registration, reporting,
exchange, trading, and major antifraud provisions of the securities laws,
contains its own definition of a security. That Act provides that "unless
the context otherwise requires," a "security" means:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or
in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national
securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2002).
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receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or
any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.' 9
The two definitional lists suggest some basic observations about the
Congressional approach to defining a security. The first observation is
that despite certain minor differences between them, the two definitions
are very nearly identical.2" Indeed, the legislative history of the
Exchange Act reveals that Congress intended the definitions to be sub-
stantially the same,2 and the Supreme Court has confirmed that the two
lists may be construed identically.22 The second observation is that each
definition defines the term security not conceptually, but by simple enu-
meration. The Supreme Court has observed that "[i]n providing this def-
inition Congress did not attempt to articulate the relevant economic
criteria for distinguishing 'securities' from 'non-securities.'"23 Instead,
Congress provided the names of instruments that constitute securities for
the purposes of the Acts, without interpretive guidance as to the mean-
ings of those names.
The courts have added to these observations a rule of construc-
tion-that the terms contained in the definitions should be read expan-
sively. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[e]ven a casual reading" of
the definitions "reveals that Congress did not intend to adopt a narrow or
restrictive concept of security.' 4 Instead, Congress "painted with a
19. Id. § 78c(a)(10).
20. For an overview of the differences between the two sections, see generally, Lewis D.
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What Is a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws?, 56 ALB.
L. REV. 473, 479-83 (1993). This article focuses on the definitions contained in the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act, but excludes consideration of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. § 80a (2002)), the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80b (2002)), the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. § 79a (2002)), and the Trust Indenture Act of
1939 (15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (2002)), each of which uses the same or similar definition of a security
as the Securities Acts, although some such definitions, such as that of the Investment Company
Act (15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (2002)), have been interpreted differently than those of the
Securities Acts.
21. The Senate Report on the Exchange Act indicates that the Exchange Act definition of
"security" was intended to be "substantially the same" as that of the Securities Act. S. Rep. No.
73-792, at 14 (1934), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 65 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
22. The Supreme Court has construed these two definitional sections identically, calling the
two definitions "virtually identical," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), and
repeatedly indicating that for most purposes the two definitions may be construed identically. See
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.l (1985); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975).
23. Forman, 421 U.S. at 847.
24. Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 338.
1200 [Vol. 57:1195
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broad brush,' 25 enacting "a definition of 'security' sufficiently broad to
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an invest-
ment." 26 Accordingly, the definitional lists include not only the "obvi-
ous and commonplace"27 instruments that most people would recognize
as securities, such as stocks, bonds, and notes, but also other, more
"[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices. ' 28 The definitions, in fact,
are not only expansive, but also self-evidently over-inclusive, leaving to
the courts and the Commission the task of distinguishing from ordinary
non-security arrangements "the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security. '"29
The Supreme Court, to ensure coverage of "any instrument that
might be sold as an investment," has extended the concept of a security
beyond the rigid terms of the statutory list by emphasizing the "eco-
nomic reality" of the instrument under consideration,3 ° not merely on the
nominal correspondence of name attached to the instrument under con-
sideration with a label on the definitional list. Accordingly, even instru-
ments not specifically included in the list can still constitute securities if
the economic reality of those instruments dictates securities treatment.3'
In order to fit "uncommon, irregular devices" into the statutory defini-
tions, two of the listed items, the "investment contract" and the "interest
or instrument commonly known as a security" have served as the catch-
all categories. The courts use these two enumerated items (primarily the
"investment contract") to bring instruments that are not enumerated in
the definitions within the scope of the Securities Acts.32
The controversial issue in the definition of a security generally has
not been the use of economic reality to include instruments not literally
included in the statutory lists, but the use of economic reality to exclude
instruments that are literally enumerated in the statutory lists.33 The tex-
25. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60 (1990).
26. Id. at 61.
27. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
28. Id. at 351.
29. H. Rep. No. 73-85, at 11 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at
11.
30. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
31. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
32. Note that the Securities Act contains the category "interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security,'" while the Exchange Act contains the slightly abbreviated formulation
"instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l) (2002), with 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2002). The Court has not attached any importance to the omission of
"interest or" in the Exchange Act definition.
33. The notion of using economic reality to include instruments nominally falling outside of
the statutory terms has long been accepted under the investment contact rubric. Nevertheless, the
notion of using economic reality to exclude instruments from the Securities Acts that are
nominally included in the statutory terms has never been explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court.
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tual support for the notion that economic reality should work both ways
is the fact that the statutory definitions are preceded by the phrase
"unless the context otherwise requires." This innocent-sounding phrase,
whether rightly or wrongly, has become the exclusionary counterweight
to the investment contract catchall category, suggesting that even instru-
ments whose labels are specifically enumerated in the definitional list
are not necessarily securities.34 Thus, under this reading of the defini-
tion-of-security cases, courts should look beyond the mere label of an
instrument 35 to determine whether, despite the instrument's nominal
inclusion within the definition of a security, the overall "context other-
wise requires."
B. Employee Incentives and Investment Contracts
In the employee incentive arena, the principle of "economic reality"
is stretched almost to its limit in squeezing the various and sundry forms
of incentives into the statutory definitions. Modem employers motivate
their employees with a variety of devices that may or may not fit into the
enumerated categories of the definitional lists. While some instruments,
such as restricted stock and employee stock options, correspond to enu-
merated categories or may be readily analogized to one or more catego-
ries, others, such as stock appreciation rights, phantom stock,
performance units, or interests in employee stock ownership or pension
plans, are not readily identified with any enumerated category of secur-
ity. Accordingly, if these instruments are to be classified as securities,
they must satisfy the criteria for one of the residual security categories,
such as the "investment contract" or the "instrument commonly known
as a security."
1. THE HOWEY-DANIEL TEST APPLIED TO EMPLOYEE INCENTIVES
In a modest triumph for jurisprudential economy, the Supreme
Court has opined that the same test applies to determine whether an
instrument falls within either of these residual categories of security.3 6
That test was first articulated in the now classic securities law case of
34. One recent student casenote observed that Howey and the context clause have come to
represent the tension at either end of the securities law spectrum that keeps the literal language of
the statutory lists from under- or over-inclusiveness, respectively. See Kyle M. Globerman, Note,
The Elusive and Changing Definition of a Security: One Test Fits All, 51 FLA. L. REV. 271, 293-
94 (1999).
35. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
36. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691 n.5; United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
852 n.12 (1975). The Court has also suggested that the "certificate of interest ... in any profit-
sharing agreement" should also be treated as coextensive with the term "investment contract." See
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.l (1979).
1202 [Vol. 57:1195
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SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.37 In Howey, the issuers of the purported securi-
ties were two affiliated companies that owned large tracts of citrus
groves in Florida.38 These companies offered to purchasers, many of
whom were tourist patrons of a local resort hotel, land plots in Florida
citrus groves.39 Considered in isolation, the interests might have been
regarded as simple land sales contracts, and therefore outside the defini-
tion of a security.4" Yet, the promoters were offering "something more
than fee simple interests in land;"41 they marketed the land sales con-
tracts together with contracts for cultivating and marketing the fruit and
remitting the net proceeds to the investors. The issue before the Court
was whether the land sales contract, combined with the service contract
for harvesting and selling the fruit, constituted an "investment contract"
and therefore a security for the purposes of the Securities Act.42
The Court approached the definitional question by looking to the
meaning of an investment contract under state securities laws. It
observed that although the term "investment contract" was undefined in
the Acts, the meaning of the term had been "crystallized" by "prior judi-
cial interpretation" under the state "blue sky" laws from which the term
was adapted.43 The Court drew upon judicial interpretations under those
blue sky laws to formulate a four-prong test for an investment contract.
That four-prong test defined an investment contract as any "contract,
transaction or scheme" whereby a person makes: (1) an investment of
money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) and is led to expect profits; (4)
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.44 Applying its
new test, the Court concluded the interests sold by the Howey compa-
nies were, in fact, investment contracts, and thereby established a test
that would dominate the federal definition-of-security jurisprudence to
the present day.4 5
In the decades since the Howey decision, the lower federal courts
37. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The test was, in large measure, adapted from the "investment
contract" test that had been formulated in state courts prior to enactment of the Securities Acts.
See, e.g., State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920).
38. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 294-95.
39. Id. at 296.
40. Id. at 297-98.
41. Id. at 299.
42. Id. at 294-97.
43. Id. at 298. The term "blue sky laws" refers to a system of state regulation of securities
that every state except Nevada had adopted prior to the adoption of the Securities Act in 1933, and
is still (to a lesser extent) important to securities practitioners today. See generally Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 31-43.
44. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
45. See generally Gabaldon, supra note 17, at 308 (noting that of the 792 securities law cases
collected, 461 dealt with investment contracts).
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have elaborated on all four prongs of the investment contract test4 6 and
the Supreme Court has provided significant guidance on all but the
"common enterprise" element.47 Among the unsettled questions, how-
ever, is the uneasy status of employee incentive and compensation
devices under the Howey test. Lower courts have provided little mean-
ingful guidance on the question of equity incentives as securities, and
many courts themselves seem confused about the proper scope of their
approach to the question.48  The dearth of meaningful analysis of
employee incentives under the Howey test, in fact, has compelled the
Commission for decades to fudge its analysis to obtain jurisdiction over
certain types of transactions in supposed employee "securities. '49
The general failure to meaningfully address the Howey test in the
context of employee incentives must, at least in part, be attributed to the
fact that lower courts, even outside the context of employee incentives,
have not sufficiently focused on the first Howey prong, the requirement
of an "investment of money." This prong is particularly important in the
context of employee incentive schemes because in many cases employ-
ees do not invest "money" in incentive instruments, and often the deci-
sion to "invest" is primarily an employment decision, not an investment
decision. Accordingly, two critical questions arise: (1) whether an
employee's "investment" of labor in exchange for a compensation pack-
age including an equity incentive instrument constitutes the "investment
of money" required to find a security under the Howey test; and (2) if so,
whether an "investment decision" is required to find an "investment."
The only Supreme Court case to explicitly analyze the "invest-
ment" component of the Howey test was International Brotherhood of
46. See generally Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 17, at 987-1010.
47. In Daniel, the Court construed the "investment of money" prong. See infra notes 65-87
and accompanying text. In Forman, the Court elaborated on the "expectation of profits" prong.
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-58 (1975). Forman also hinted at its
resolution of the troublesome "solely" language in the "solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party" prong of Howey, restating the test as "a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852. There is also an argument
that the Court implicitly adopted the so-called "horizontal commonality" approach in the Marine
Bank case, but the better view is that Marine Bank said nothing about the common enterprise
prong.
48. In a recent insider trading case, Clay v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 157 F.3d 1259 (11 th Cir.
1998), the Eleventh Circuit leaped to the conclusion that stock appreciation rights (SARs) were
not "securities, puts, calls, straddles, options or privileges with respect to securities." Id. at 1269.
The court, over the objection of concurring Judge Carnes, astonishingly reached that holding
without considering the investment contract analysis. The court, however, subsequently vacated
these portions of the opinion on consideration of the petition for rehearing, leaving only the
unremarkable conclusion that the SARs were not the same class of security as the Riverwood
common stock. See id. at 1269-71.
49. The most blatant example in this regard is the Commission's treatment of stock
appreciation rights. See infra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
1204 [Vol. 57:1195
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Teamsters v. Daniel.5" In that case, the Court was called upon to decide
whether interests in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan consti-
tuted a security within the meaning of the Securities Acts. 51 The pen-
sion plan at issue was the result of multi-employer collective bargaining
that took place in 1954 between a labor union and various Chicago
trucking firms.5 2 When the respondent Daniel retired in 1973, the plan's
administrator determined that he was ineligible for a pension because of
a brief break in his service. Daniel brought suit in federal court against
the union, its local branch, and a trustee of the pension trust fund alleg-
ing, inter alia, violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Acts.54
The defendants moved to dismiss the securities counts of the com-
plaints on the basis that Mr. Daniel's complaint stated no cause of action
under the Securities Acts.55 The district court denied the motion, finding
that Daniel's interest in the pension fund constituted a security within
the meaning of the Securities Acts, and further finding that there had
been a "sale" of that "security" interest within the meaning of the Acts.56
The order denying the motion was certified for appeal and the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 7 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that Daniel's inter-
est in the noncontributory, compulsory pension plan was not a security
within the meaning of the Securities Acts.58
The fact that interests in pension funds are not enumerated as a
category of security in the statutory definitions meant that the Court
would have to find the pension interests were an "investment contract"
(or other residual category) to treat them as "securities." Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, found that Daniel, who made no contributions to
the fund and had no choice about whether to participate, had not made
the "investment" required by the first prong of the Howey investment
contract test.59 The Court went on to observe that the argument that
Daniel's pension benefits were a security was also undermined by the
relative insignificance of the asset earnings of the fund versus the
50. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
51. Id. at 553.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 554-55.
54. Daniel alleged that the defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2002)), Rule lOb-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2002)), and Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act (15 U.S.C. § 77q (2002)). See id. at 555.
55. Id. at 556.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 557.
58. Id. at 570.
59. Id. at 560.
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employer's contributions to the fund.6° In other words, Daniel did not
have a sufficient "expectation of profit" for his interest in the fund to
constitute a security.6 Finally, the Court added as an afterthought the
additional observation that the security afforded the pension plan by its
regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) 62 militated against the finding of a security.
63
The Daniel case has been generally interpreted as a clarification of
the treatment of pension plans or, more broadly, of employee benefit
plans in general.64 In reality, however, the reasoning of the Daniel case
is both broader and narrower than the common interpretation would sug-
gest. The case is narrower than is commonly thought in the sense that it
does not govern the disposition of all pension plans, and certainly not all
employee benefit plans. The case is also broader than is commonly
thought in the sense that it addresses the meaning of the "investment"
prong for all purported investment contracts, not just "plans."
The real contribution of Daniel was its resolution of two important
issues with respect to the Howey investment prong. First, the Court
made it clear that Howey's "investment of money" prong does not nec-
essarily require an investment of "cash"-that is, "goods and services"
may suffice as an "investment."65 Second, the Court emphasized that a
determination with respect to the investment prong of the Howey test
requires an analysis of the "entire transaction" involving the purported
security, not merely the characteristics of the purported security instru-
ment itself.66
The first clarification, that goods and services can constitute an
investment, is reasonably straightforward and uncontroversial. While
"money" may be the usual consideration for securities, there is no reason
why goods, services, or other securities may not also constitute an
investment. The Court's second clarification, that the "entire transac-
tion" must be analyzed to determine the presence of an investment, has
proved less palatable to courts and commentators.67 In the Court's view,
the Howey test should be used "[t]o determine whether a particular
60. Id. at 561-62.
61. Id.
62. Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974).
63. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70.
64. Employer Benefit Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6188, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1051, at 2073-3 (Feb. 1, 1980) [hereinafter Release 6188].
65. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560 n.12. Courts had held that other instruments or securities, such as
promissory notes, could constitute an "investment" even before Daniel. See, e.g., Hector v.
Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976).
66. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.
67. See infra Part III.C.
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financial relationship constitutes an investment contract,"68 as opposed
to whether an instrument itself constitutes such a contract. The Court
explained that "[i]n order to determine whether respondent invested in
the Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it is nec-
essary to look at the entire transaction through which he obtained a
chance to receive pension benefits."69 Thus, the relevant considerations
are not limited to whether the purported investment contract itself has
investment characteristics, but must also encompass the motivation of
the "purchaser" in surrendering his "investment."70
The "entire transaction" approach means that the mere fact that a
particular "financial relationship" may involve some investment ele-
ments is not sufficient to establish the existence of an "investment." The
Daniel analysis broke up the concept of an "investment" into two com-
ponents: a consideration component and an investment decision compo-
nent."' To determine whether a person was an "investor," the Daniel
Court required that such person "chose to give up a specific considera-
tion in return for ... a security."72 Where a person has not surrendered a
"specific consideration," he has not made an "investment" under Daniel.
Likewise, even where a person does give up a specific consideration, if
that person does not choose to surrender that consideration, he has not
made an investment decision or an investment.
The Daniel Court did not stop, however, with the abstract observa-
tion that the "entire transaction" or "financial relationship" should be
examined to determine whether a person has made an investment.
Daniel grappled with the troublesome issue of whether the "entire trans-
action" of an employment relationship demands that an employee "give
up a specific consideration" or make an investment decision with respect
to his compensation.73 The Court observed that in the pension plan at
issue "the purported investment [was] a relatively insignificant part of an
employee's total and indivisible compensation package."74 While the
pension benefits may theoretically have influenced Daniel's employ-
68. Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
70. See infra Part l1l.B.2.a.
71. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has read Daniel as concluding that the "plan's
noncontributory structure precluded the plaintiff from making the requisite investment at the same
time that its involuntary component prevented him from making an affirmative investment
decision 'to give up a specific consideration in return for a separable financial interest with the
characteristics of a security."' Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564, 573
(10th Cir. 1991); see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 81 F. Supp. 2d 550, 557 (D.N.J. 2000)
("A hallmark of a 'voluntary' plan is the ability of the employee to make an 'investment decision'
to acquire the stock options.").
72. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.
73. Id. at 559-60.
74. Id. at 560.
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ment decision, as a practical matter the Court observed that the "decision
to accept and retain covered employment may have only an attenuated
relationship, if any, to perceived investment possibilities."75 Such an
"attenuated relationship," the Court determined, did not constitute a
"choice" to surrender "specific consideration" and therefore failed the
investment prong.76
The "attenuated relationship" to investment possibilities in Daniel
applies with equal force to many compensatory instruments other than
pensions. Equity incentives for rank-and-file employees, when availa-
ble, are frequently part of an incentive and compensation "package" and
are accompanied by salary, pension, and other benefits. For rank-and-
file employees, that "package" is often indivisible and not subject to
individual negotiation. In such cases, the Daniel Court's reasoning
applies; the employee, like Mr. Daniel, "surrenders his labor as a whole,
and in return receives a compensation package that is substantially
devoid of aspects resembling a security." 77 That is, for rank-and-file
employees, any security component of their compensation is often part
of an indivisible package in which the non-security components
predominate.
The Daniel Court's conclusion was not, as might be presumed, that
personal services cannot suffice as a specific consideration.78 The
Court's point was that the employee, in order to be an "investor," must
be in a position to make an individual investment decision about
exchanging "specific consideration" for a "separable financial interest
with the characteristics of a security."79 This observation responded to
the court of appeals opinion which asserted, in the context of pension
plans, that "the employment fringe benefit aspect of a pension can be
separated from its security aspects." 80
Moreover, the rule in Daniel is not that the "investment" compo-
nent of an employment relationship is irrelevant merely because that
investment component is coupled with a non-investment employment
decision. As the Seventh Circuit has observed, "[t]he securities acts
apply to investment decisions, even those made indirectly or bound up
with other decisions, such as employment."81 Instead, the Daniel rule is
75. Id.
76. Id. at 559-60.
77. Id.
78. Some courts have, unfortunately, read Daniel as supporting the proposition that labor is
not sufficient consideration, a reading that has brought disrepute on the Daniel decision as a
whole. See, e.g., Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (D.C.W. Va. 1983).
79. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.
80. Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1237 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1987).
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that an insignificant "investment" component of a larger, indivisible
employment relationship will not transform the entire relationship into a
securities transaction. There is no investment unless, as one district
court put it, "the compensation package as a whole exhibit[s] 'the char-
acteristics of a security.' "82 Thus, where the employee is not in a posi-
tion to choose to surrender a specific consideration, then, in the Supreme
Court's phraseology, "[o]nly in the most abstract sense may it be said
that an employee 'exchanges' some portion of his labor in return for
these possible benefits."83 This approach is simply another formulation
of the "entire transaction" analysis.
The crucial lesson of the Daniel case, therefore, is that where there
is no decision to invest made by the employee nor any exchange of
specific consideration on her behalf, there is no investment, and accord-
ingly no investment contract. Expressed differently, where a plan is
involuntary or compulsory, in the sense that any purported investment
elements are the automatic accompaniments of the employment relation-
ship, the employee simply has no separable investment decision to
make. And where a plan based on an employee contribution has only an
"abstract" or "attenuated" relationship to the purported security, the pur-
ported investment is, as a practical matter, a noncontributory benefit.
Thus, in applying Daniel's learning about noncontributory, compulsory
employee compensation outside the pension context, the key is ascer-
taining which types of equity incentives, other than pension plans, are
"noncontributory" and "compulsory" within the meaning of the Daniel
case.
From the perspective of rank-and-file employees, it turns out that
many equity incentives, when properly analyzed, would fail the Daniel
"investment" analysis within the meaning of the investment contract
rubric.84 The equity incentives of non-executive employees are often
structured as an automatic incident of the employment relationship-as
a take-or-leave-it employment proposition. The employee, therefore,
"surrenders his labor as a whole," often for an incentive instrument that,
in the words of Daniel, is "a relatively insignificant part of [the]
employee's total and indivisible compensation package."85  The
employee, like the respondent in Daniel, "is selling his labor primarily
82. Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1158 (D.D.C. 1986).
83. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560.
84. Surprisingly, only a few cases have applied the Daniel analysis outside the context of
pension plans. But see, e.g., Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (D.C.W. Va. 1983).
(applying the Daniel approach to an employee stock ownership plan to determine that no
"investment" of labor occurred satisfying the "value" requirement of the Securities Act).
85. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560.
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to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment."86 Thus, as one com-
mentator notes, "[a]fter Daniel... serious doubts about the presence of
a security must arise when, under the circumstances of the purchase, it is
impossible to find a divisible portion of the consideration that is attribu-
table to the acquisition of the instrument.
8 7
The Daniel argument for non-security treatment, at least in its strict
form, applies only to equity incentives that do not correspond to any of
the enumerated categories of security. As discussed above, the more
unusual instruments not specifically identified in the statutory lists can
only come within the regulatory purview of the Acts if they qualify as
"investment contracts" or as another residual category of security.
Unenumerated equity incentives, when regarded through the lens of
Daniel, could therefore fail the "investment" prong of the Howey test
and not constitute securities. Thus, while stock, a specifically enumer-
ated category of security, would still be a security even when given as an
incentive or bonus to employees, broad-based stock appreciation rights,
phantom stock, or performance units should not constitute securities
when granted in the context of non-negotiated broad-based employee
incentive programs.
2. "INVESTMENT" VERSUS "SALE" AND THE DEMISE OF DANIEL
The distinct analytical contribution Daniel made to the "investment
of money" prong of the investment contract test has been largely lost,
however, in subsequent case law and commentary. The slide of Daniel
into relative obscurity may be attributed to three principal factors. First,
the Daniel "investment" test was simply too easy to gloss over in most
non-plan employee incentive cases; courts have assumed Daniel was
met whenever an employee received some type of "separable financial
interest," without consideration of the other components of the Daniel
"investment" test.88 Second, courts have rarely ever applied the Daniel
"investment" test to securities generally, regarding Daniel as a "pension
plan" case, or slightly more broadly as a "plan" case, but not an "invest-
ment contract" or an "investment" case generally. Finally, the Daniel
analysis of an "investment" has lost its separate identity because of its
similarity to the concept of a "sale" under the Securities Act; the sepa-
rate "investment" analysis effectively merged into the virtually identical
concept of a "sale."
86. Id.
87. FitzGibbon, supra note 17, at 905.
88. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
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a. Separating the "Separable Financial Interest" Component
The first reason for the slide into obscurity of Daniel's "invest-
ment" test outside the context of employee benefit plan interests is that it
is simply easier to treat as determinative the superficial parts of the
Daniel test than to give effect to the whole test set forth by the Court.
The Daniel analysis of what constitutes an investment should be
regarded as a four-part test. Specifically, Daniel noted that in every
Supreme Court case where a "security" was found, "the person found to
have been an investor (1) chose (2) to give up a specific consideration
(3) in return for a separable financial interest (4) with the characteristics
of a security."89 Each of these components is necessary to establish the
presence of an "investment" under Daniel, but only the third and fourth
factors of the test are commonly taken into account.
The problem is that when the incentive instrument received by an
employee happens to be a stock option or other tangible written instru-
ment, courts are tempted to regard that instrument as a "separable finan-
cial interest with the characteristics of a security" simply because the
courts can see, touch, and construe the "separate" written document.
This approach elevates the mere separable form over the inseparable
substance of the instrument. The fact is, such instruments are not "sepa-
rable" from the employment in almost any meaningful sense. Such
instruments are so closely tied to the employment relationship that they
do not even have value apart from the employment relationship. For
example, employee stock options and stock appreciation rights customa-
rily terminate ninety days after termination of employment,90 even when
those interests have "vested" under the relevant plan. Thus, those instru-
ments are, in a very real sense, inseparable from the larger employment
relationship.
The second crucial issue that is ignored by the separability analysis
is that even if the instrument were considered separable from the
employment relationship, other than in the context of stock purchase
plans, it would be uncommon to find a broad-based employee plan that
allowed employees to "choose" to contribute a separate consideration in
exchange for the purported security. Under such plans, employees
receive grants of equity interests at the discretion of an administrating
committee designated by the board of directors. Employees have no
contractual expectation of benefits, and are not entitled to "choose" to
89. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.
90. This characteristic appears generally in many stock option plans, whether the options
qualify as "incentive stock options" under the Internal Revenue Code or not, even though the
requirement of this provision is only a legal requirement for incentive stock options. See, e.g.,
KRAUS, supra note 8, § 8.02[2].
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
receive equity interests under the plans. The only decision the employee
makes is that employee's "decision to accept and retain covered employ-
ment," and as we have seen in the context of rank-and-file employees,
that decision has "only an attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived
investment possibilities."'
b. Relegating Daniel to Plan Interests
The second reason for the untimely demise of Daniel is another
species of focus on the less important aspects of Daniel to the detriment
of the more important ones. Specifically, despite the conceptually
sweeping implications of the case, in the twenty years since the decision
few federal cases have extended its reasoning beyond the immediate
pension plan context, and virtually none have extended it beyond the
context of employee benefit plans in general.92 Courts appear to have
focused exclusively on the fact that Daniel involved pension plan inter-
ests, ignoring the real issue in the case-the meaning of an investment
contract and, as we shall see, of securities generally.93
This misreading is the result of the focus of courts on the "expecta-
tion of profits" discussion in Daniel to the detriment of the "investment
of money" discussion. There is little serious dispute that the core hold-
ing in Daniel was predicated on the noncontributory, compulsory nature
of the plan, not on the presence of employer contributions, the plan's
defined benefit nature, or the plan's regulation under ERISA.94 Even the
Commission recognized shortly after the Daniel case that the key hold-
ing in that case was on the noncontributory, compulsory nature of the
pension plan at issue.95 Some courts have so thoroughly missed Daniel
91. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 560.
92. The farthest extension generally ventured is to employee stock ownership plans. See, e.g.,
Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1991). Some cases have
used Daniel's "investment" prong to defeat security treatment for plan interests that are, in fact,
incentive plans. See, e.g., Simon v. Fribourg, 650 F. Supp. 319 (D. Minn. 1986). Nevertheless,
such decisions were still rendered in the context of plan interests.
93. The irony is that this very failure to focus on the most important elements of the
instrument itself was the basis of the Daniel Court's reversal of the lower court. See Daniel, 439
U.S. at 561 ("As in other parts of its analysis, the court below found an expectation of profit in the
pension plan only by focusing on one of its less important aspects to the exclusion of its more
significant elements.").
94. The Court specifically stated its holding as "[wle hold that the Securities Acts do not
apply to a noncontributory compulsory pension plan," id. at 570, making no reference to ERISA,
to the defined benefit nature of the plan, or to the relative importance of employer contributions
over plan investment return.
95. The Commission stated that:
The Supreme Court's opinion in [the Daniel] case, however, did not rest on the fact
that the plan was a defined benefit one. Instead, the Court based its decision on the
involuntary nature of the plan (unlike all prior cases of the Court involving
securities, the employees did not have a choice whether to participate) and the fact
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as to read the case as supporting a categorical rule that "a pension plan
does not constitute a security,"96 without even considering the plan's
voluntary or contributory nature. Even those courts that have under-
stood that the "noncontributory, compulsory" nature of the Daniel inter-
ests were the key to the holding in that case have implied that that
holding is limited to the context of "plans. 97
This process was starkly illustrated in Black v. Payne,9 8 decided
shortly after Daniel. There, the court held that an employee's interest in
the California Public Employees Retirement System pension plan was
not a security under the Securities Acts.99 The pension plan was a com-
pulsory but contributory one, and therefore not directly addressed by
Daniel. The court, probably to avoid facing the tougher issue of whether
an "investment" exists in a compulsory but contributory plan, predicated
its holding on the absence of an "expectation of profits."'" The troub-
ling observation, however, was the court's statement that "[b]oth this
court and the Supreme Court have noted that while the Howey test has
two components-the 'investment of money' and an expectation of
'profits to come solely from the efforts of others'-the latter is the more
critical factor."' 0' In fact, the Supreme Court has never said any such
thing; the Howey prongs are not "factors" in some indeterminate balanc-
ing test, but individual requirements that must each be met to find an
investment contract.
Thus, the distinctiveness of the Daniel analysis disappeared in large
part because courts were more comfortable disposing of cases on plan-
specific grounds, rather than investment-specific grounds. Some courts,
for example, have relied on the "defined benefit" nature of Daniel and
regulation under ERISA as authority for finding even a voluntary, par-
tially contributory plan to constitute a non-security, 0 2 and other courts
have relied on the "expectation of profits" aspect of Daniel to hold such
that the plan did not provide for direct, identifiable contributions by employees (the
employees' labor could be considered a contribution 'only in the most abstract
sense').
Release 6188, supra note 64, at 2073-7 to 2073-8. Further, the Commission also indicated that
"the ERISA requirements would not be a barrier to finding an investment contract present," id. at
2073-11, thus reinforcing the importance of the "investment" element.
96. Manchester Bank v. Conn. Bank & Trust, 497 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (D.N.H. 1980).
97. See Uselton, 940 F.2d at 586.
98. 591 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1979).
99. Id. at 88.
100. Id. at 87-88. In fact, the court specifically stated that it did not need to reach the
"investment" issue. See id. at 88 n.4.
101. See id. at 87.
102. See Tanuggi v. Grolier Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also
O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (D. Md. 1982) (finding no "expectation of
profit solely from the efforts of others" in a voluntary, contributory plan).
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pension plans non-securities." 3 Thus, while the Commission made it
clear that the dispositive holding in Daniel was the fact that the plan at
issue was not voluntary or contributory, relatively few courts have
reached the right determination by regarding those characteristics as dis-
positive."° That failure may help to explain why the "investment"
prong of Daniel has slid into obscurity.
c. Investment versus Sale Distinction
The third and most important consideration in the demise of
Daniel's separate analytical significance is the similarity of the concept
of an "investment" under Daniel to that of a "sale" under Section 2(a)(3)
of the Securities Act. The Daniel investment prong intuitively resem-
bles the securities law idea of a sale, and in fact traces its lineage to the
Commission's articulation of a "sale."' 5 The problem from the per-
spective of preserving the independent analytical significance of an
investment is that, like a finding of no security, a finding of no sale is
dispositive as to most Securities Act claims. Where a court can dispose
of a Securities Act claim on the narrower basis of "no sale," that court is
unlikely to risk taking the additional step of finding "no security," even
though (for an investment contract case) that latter finding would be
implied by a finding of "no sale." As a consequence, the independent
significance of the "no investment" construct was effectively eclipsed by
its analytical similarity to the more easily judicially comprehensible and
seemingly narrower holding of "no sale."
The Securities Act concept of a "sale" has evolved in an ad hoc
manner under the pertinent case law. Section 2(a)(3), which defines the
term "sale" for the purposes of the Securities Act, provides that "[t]he
term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of
a security or interest in a security, for value."' 06 In comparing the term
103. See Coward v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230, 1237 (7th Cir. 1982); see also
Cunha v. Ward Foods, 545 F. Supp. 94, 99-101 (D. Haw. 1982) (holding that a voluntary,
contributory plan was not a security). Note that these decisions do not necessarily conflict with
Daniel, as Daniel merely held that an interest in a compulsory, noncontributory plan was not a
security, not the converse proposition that an interest in a voluntary, contributory plan necessarily
was a security. The chief vice of these cases is that they imply that Daniel supported an exclusion
from the term "security" for pension plans generally, as opposed to pension plans not involving an
"investment."
104. Some courts have, however, interpreted Daniel correctly. See, e.g., Salazar v. Sandia
Corp., 656 F.2d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[Il]f not both voluntary and contributory the plan
cannot be a security."); Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 573-
74 (10th Cir. 1991). ("[An employee benefit plan that is either noncontributory or compulsory is
not an investment contract because it does not allow a participant to make the 'investment'
required by the first prong of the Howey test.").
105. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(a)(3) (2002).
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"investment" to the term "sale," the key words in this definition are "for
value." In the courts' view, whether "value" is present in a purported
"sale" is a context-specific undertaking; while there may be no general
definition, "it is pretty well understood that certain types of disposition
are regarded as made for 'value' and others are not."'' 7 The best that
can be said as a general rule, as Professor Loss has observed, is that the
Commission "has not attempted any metaphysical distinction between
'value' and 'consideration.' "108
The concept of an investment for the purposes of the investment
contract analysis, as articulated by Daniel, looks to the "contributory"
and "voluntary" nature of the purported "investment." In order to have
an "investment," there must be a "specific consideration" and a
"choice," or investment decision, to find a voluntary, contributory plan
and therefore an "investment." These two components are similar to the
concept of a "sale" under the Securities Act, which requires "value" and
arguably an "investment decision."1 °9 The apparent similarity of the
"investment" prong to the concept of "value" under Section 2(a)(3) has
led many courts to read Daniel as authority for construing the contours
of the "value" requirement." 0 The Daniel concept of "consideration"
seems identical to the notion of "value," and in the absence of any spe-
cialized securities law definition of value, the Daniel concept of a "sepa-
rate consideration" has become a reliable surrogate for value,
particularly in the employee benefit context.
The conceptual crossover between "investment" and "value" has,
from its inception, persuaded the Commission as well. The Commission
has applied identical tests for the two concepts and cited one concept as
authority for the other. For example, in the Commission's Securities
Act Release Number 6281, the Commission explained that, "[a]s noted
in Release 6188 . . . a plan may also be deemed to be voluntary and
contributory and therefore to involve a sale of a security in those
instances where participating employees individually bargain to contrib-
107. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 1138.20-.21.
108. Id. at 1138.20.
109. The courts have not been entirely clear about whether the concept of an "investment
decision" is a requirement for finding a "sale," or whether the investment decision is relevant to
some other dispositive element of a claim under the various antifraud provisions of the securities
laws. Some courts have read "investment decision" out of the sale concept entirely, even in the
context of employee benefit plans. See, e.g., Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223,
1243 (7th Cir. 1977) ("The definitions of 'sale' in the 1933 and 1934 Acts do not require
volition."); other courts have retained the notion of an "investment decision" but have presented it
as a question of reliance, see, e.g., Isquith by Isquith v. Caremark Int'l, Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 534
(7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a person who makes "no investment decision" is not "induced by"
and has not "relied on" a purported misrepresentation), or as a matter of "duty" or "causation."
See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 815 F.2d 429, 437-38 (7th Cir. 1987).
110. See, e.g., Bauman v. Bish, 571 F. Supp. 1054 (D.C.W. Va. 1983).
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ute their services in exchange for interests in the plan."'I The "volun-
tary" versus "compulsory" and "contributory" versus "non-contributory"
distinction, as the reader will recall, is the same distinction employed by
Daniel to determine whether there is an investment within the meaning
of the Howey test." 2 Further, the Commission, as authority for this
statement, cited the "separately bargained consideration" language that
is surprisingly similar to the "specific consideration" required for an
investment under Daniel.' 13
The kinship between the concept of a "sale" under Section 2(a)(3)
and the concept of an "investment" developed in the Daniel case is not
only not purely coincidental, but may actually be intentional. There is at
least some evidence that the Court deliberately fused the two concepts in
that decision. In a portion of the opinion rebutting the Commission's
assertion that a noncontributory plan could constitute a security, the
Court explained that the Commission, "[i]n an attempt to reconcile
[past] interpretations of the Securities Acts with its present stand,"
argued that there could be a "security" "even where a 'sale' is not
involved."'" ' The Court noted that "none of the SEC opinions, reports,
or testimony cited to us address the question," ' 5 implying that the Court
was at least skeptical that a security could exist without a sale. The
Court then proceeded to copy the Commission's phraseology for a
"sale" to create its new definitional concept of an "investment."1'1 6
Given the fact that the Daniel case drew its "investment" analysis from
the Commission's "sale" analysis, and the Commission subsequently
restated that "investment" analysis in its "sale" analysis, it seems safe to
say that both camps regard the two concepts as functionally identical.
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DANIEL
The Daniel case suggested, and the foregoing discussion further
reveals, the somewhat unconventional notion that a security, at least in
11. Plan Subject to the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6281, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1052, at 2073-31 n.6 (Jan. 15, 1981) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Release 6281].
112. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979).
113. See Release 6281, supra note I11.
114. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 567 (1979).
115. Id.
116. The Commission articulated the contributory/compulsory distinction in the plan context
almost from the inception of the Acts. See Opinion of the Assistant General Counsel of
Commission, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 75,195 (1941).
[lit is because of the language of Section 2(3) that no "offer" or "sale" occurs in the
case of a non-contributory plan, where employees are not requested to make any
contributions, or in the case of a compulsory plan, where there is no element of
volition on the part of employees whether or not to participate and make
contributions.
1216 [Vol. 57:1195
2003] EMPLO YEE INCENTIVES AND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 1217
the form of an investment contract, does not exist in the absence of a
"sale" of that instrument. The Commission has indicated that when
instruments are awarded to employees pursuant to certain types of incen-
tive plans, there is no sale unless employees "individually bargain to
contribute cash or other tangible or definable consideration to such
plans."'1"7 Since the concept of a "sale" is functionally equivalent to the
concept of an "investment" under Howey, employee incentives that do
not fall within an enumerated category of security must be the subject of
a sale if they are to be regarded as securities. Thus, the real uncertainty
associated with the Daniel decision is not connected with its impact on
unenumerated instruments as discussed above, but with the much more
troublesome case of employee stock options, which arguably are an enu-
merated category of security.
III. EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS AND THE SECURITIES ACTS
The analysis of employee stock options differs from that of the
other categories described above because stock options arguably fall
within one or more enumerated categories of security specifically enu-
merated in the definitions. There is little doubt that ordinary options to
purchase stock outside the employment context constitute securities for
purposes of the Securities Acts. Not only does the definition of "secur-
ity" in both Acts expressly include "any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security" and any "warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any [security]," 8 but the courts have regularly confirmed that
options are securities. "19 This is where the security analysis of employee
stock options has ended for virtually all courts and commentators-
"options" are included in the definition, so employee stock options are
per se securities.
The problem for the simplistic "facial interpretation" approach is
that in spite of the literal terms of the statutory language, the Supreme
Court has held that the term "any note" in the definitional lists does not
literally mean "any note" for the purposes of the Securities Acts. 120 The
117. Release 6188, supra note 64, at 2073-15.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2000). Not only are such options themselves securities, but they
also embody the right to purchase other securities. A put represents the right to sell an underlying
security at a fixed exercise price. A call represents the right to purchase an underlying security at a
fixed exercise price. Thus, as Professor Loss observed, options have a "dual personality. They are
themselves 'securities' at the same time that they represent offers to sell other securities." Louis
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 467 (2d ed. 1961).
119. See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball, & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1026 n.40 (6th Cir.
1979); LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819, 832 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
see also Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, 532 U.S. 588 (2001) (citing Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750-51 (1975)).
120. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990).
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Court has even held that stock is not always "stock" for the purposes of
the Acts.' 2' In fact, as this Part will describe, the Supreme Court has
applied a contextual, fact-specific test to determine whether an instru-
ment nominally included in the definitional list is, in fact, a "security"
within the meaning of the Securities Acts. This Part will address the
question of whether the fact that the definitional lists nominally include
any "warrant," "right," "call," or "option" means that any employee
stock option is necessarily a security for the purposes of the Securities
Acts.
A. The Rise and Fall of the Howey Test
There has been little serious scholarly or judicial consideration of
whether employee stock options constitute securities for the purposes of
the Securities Acts. Most courts and practitioners have simply assumed,
often without analysis, that security treatment is compelled by the literal
terms of the statutory definitions.' 22 In order to understand the reluc-
tance of lower courts and commentators to look beyond the superficial
literal terms of the definitions, it is instructive to consider the effect of
Howey's subsequent history and reputation on the credibility of Supreme
Court dicta in this area.
In 1975, roughly four years before Daniel, the Supreme Court
decided the groundbreaking case of United Housing Foundation v. For-
man. 23 In that case, the Court concluded that shares of stock in a New
York City housing cooperative were not securities within the meaning of
the Securities Acts.' 24 The Court relied on the fact that the so-called
stock involved in that case bore none of the characteristics "traditionally
associated with stock."' 2 5 The purchasers of that stock, tenants in the
cooperative, parted with their money to acquire low-cost subsidized liv-
ing space for personal use, not investment securities. 26 Having con-
cluded that the instruments denominated "stock" were not in fact
"stock," the Court addressed the argument that the shares were invest-
ment contracts.' 27 This segment of Justice Powell's analysis spawned a
significant detour in the evolution of the definition of a security.
In the Forman opinion, Justice Powell appeared to set forth a uni-
versal test for the definition of a security. Admiring the apparent versa-
121. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975).
122. See, e.g., Fenoglio v. Augat, 50 F. Supp. 46 (D. Mass. 1999).
123. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
124. Id. at 847.
125. Id. at 851.
126. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985) (explaining Fornan's
holding).
127. Id. at 689.
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tility of the Howey test, Justice Powell observed that that test, "in
shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of
the Court's decisions defining a security."' 28 Some commentators rea-
sonably concluded that Howey would thenceforth constitute a restraining
force on the expansion of regulatory coverage of all categories of securi-
ties, not merely of investment contracts. 29 Similarly, many federal
courts adopted Howey as the universal archetype of a "security."'' 30 One
court went so far as to laud the Howey test as "a kind of sacred measure
of the existence of a security."' 3' That "sacred measure" of a "security"
appeared to be destined for posterity when Justice Powell reaffirmed the
same statement in footnote eleven of his opinion in the Daniel case only
a few years later.'32
The Court, however, repudiated this interpretation of the Howey
test when Justice Powell wrote his next definition-of-security opinion a
decade later in Landreth Timber v. Landreth.133 In that case, Justice
Powell slipped in another footnote that called his previous footnote a
"bit of dicta"' 34-o-ne of the most vicious epithets the Supreme Court
can apply to anything it regrets having said. A backtracking Justice
Powell explained that what he meant was that there was no distinction
"for [then] present purposes"' between the test for "'investment con-
tracts'" and that for another "general category" of security, the "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security.' '3  Further, Justice Powell
explicitly stated that "the Howey economic reality test was designed to
determine whether a particular instrument is an 'investment contract,'
not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory
definition of 'security.' "136 Justice Powell was even confident enough
128. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. In Professor McGinty's terms, the Court, beholding the test of
its own creation, chose to "look with pride at the Howey test and say, 'That's my child.'" See
Park McGinty, What is a Security?, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1033, 1081.
129. See, e.g., John Deacon & James D. Prendergast, Defining a "Security" After the Forman
Decision, l1 PAC. L.J. 213, 217-18 (1980).
130. See, e.g., Baurer v. Planning Group, 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying the
Howey investment contract test to promissory notes); LTV v. UMIC Gov't Sec., Inc., 523 F. Supp.
819, 828 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (noting that the statements in Forman and Daniel "naturally enough,
has led to speculation that the elements of an 'investment contract' are generic to all securities");
Hackford v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 541, 555 (D. Utah 1981) ("[lIt should generally
be of non moment which of the forms listed in § 3(a)(10) a transaction most closely resembles.
The Howey test capably exposes the economic reality necessary to determine whether any form of
transaction falls within the Act's definition of a 'security.'").
131. Braniff Airways v. LTV Corp., 479 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
132. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.I I (1979); see also Braniff
Airways, 479 F. Supp. at 1287.
133. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
134. Id. at 691 n.5.
135. Id. at 691-92 n.5.
136. Id. at 691. In Professor McGinty's terms, the Court, beholding the test, "rightly viewed it
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to follow that conclusion with the dubious proposition that "[o]ur cases
are consistent with that view."' 137
Justice Powell's explanation of the Daniel footnote in Landreth
was, at best, a creative reinterpretation of what the Forman and Daniel
cases actually said.'38 Enough courts and commentators were burned by
this palinode that they would never again take any universal-sounding
Supreme Court test at face value. But this once-bitten mentality of
courts and commentators has distorted both the Howey test and the sub-
sequent definition-of-security cases. With respect to the Howey case, it
is true that the Landreth Court forcefully repudiated Daniel's assertion
that the Howey test applied to all categories of security, but nowhere did
the Landreth Court repudiate Daniel's lengthy discussion of the "invest-
ment" requirement. This failure is significant because the Court in
Daniel specifically made a separate "universal" statement regarding the
"investment" prong of the Howey test. Specifically, Justice Powell
stated that "[i]n every decision of this Court recognizing the presence of
a 'security' under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an
investor chose to give up a specific consideration in return for a separa-
ble financial interest with the characteristics of a security."' 39
It is possible, of course, that Justice Powell simply overlooked his
second universal proclamation about the nature of securities. It is also
possible that Justice Powell found it unnecessary to repudiate this sec-
ond statement because it was not briefed by the parties. 4' The fact is,
however, that the Court did explicitly declare that "every decision" find-
ing the presence of a security had involved transactions satisfying the
"investment" prong of the Howey test. While Landreth justifiably
spooked the securities law community from taking any universal
Supreme Court statement in this area at face value, it is difficult to per-
ceive any principled reason why an "investment contract" should require
an "investment" while a stock, bond, option, or note should require no
"investment" at all. 4 ' In fact, one commentator has, independently of
the Court's statement in Daniel, taken the position that the legislative
purpose of the Acts supports the proposition that "[w]here there is no
with horror; wrongly said 'That's not my child!' and euthanized it." McGinty, supra note 128, at
1081.
137. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691 (1985).
138. Justice Powell delivered the Court's opinion in Forman, Daniel, and Landreth.
139. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979).
140. For example, in Landreth, Justice Powell refuted the footnote II assertion in response to
the respondents' "contention that the Court has mandated use of the Howey test whenever it
determines whether an instrument is a 'security."' Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691 n.5.
141. It is possible that the Landreth Court did not, in fact, intend to imply that an investment
was not necessary for finding that a stock is a security within the meaning of the Acts, but only
that the Howey test as a unified whole did not apply outside the context of investment contracts.
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investment, the securities laws are not involved."' 4 2 This position is
supported by Justice Marshall's observation in Reves, that "Congress'
purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in
whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called."' 43
In the absence of some persuasive reason not to apply the "investment"
requirement generally, it makes sense to take Justice Powell at his word.
The aversion to extending any portion of Howey outside the invest-
ment contract context is understandable, but also may be seen to be
unnecessary with respect to the "investment" prong by examining the
experience with the test in the wake of Forman and Daniel. The repudi-
ation of a universal application of the Howey test was inevitable, not
because the Court did not clearly extend Howey, but because the invest-
ment contract test was unworkable as a universal test for debt instru-
ments in general and notes in particular. 44 Although the extension of
Howey caused courts and commentators considerable heartburn about
the test, the widespread outrage was not focused on the horrors of apply-
ing the "investment" prong of Howey, but on the "common enterprise"
and the "expectation of profits" prongs,145 with a lesser emphasis on the
"efforts of others" prong. 146 Thus, the more plausible explanation is not
that the Landreth Court found it necessary to repudiate the "investment"
prong, but rather that it sought to avoid the problems associated with the
"sale-of-business" doctrine (a Howey derivative), 47 and from applying
the Howey test to notes. This was, in fact, the concern that arose after
the Forman case, intensified after the Daniel case,14 8 and was finally
142. McGinty, supra note 128, at 1087.
143. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
144. Interestingly, commentators differed in their assessment about what effect Howey would
have on treatment of "notes." Compare Edward Sonnenschein, Jr., Federal Securities Law
Coverage of Note Transactions: The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW 1567, 1594-95 (1980)
(arguing that the Howey test, if universally applicable to all "securities," could make it very
difficult to classify notes and other debt instruments as "securities" under the Acts), with
FitzGibbon, supra note 17, at 900-01 ("The [Howey] test provides no way to avoid the conclusion
that virtually all loans involve securities.") and McGinty, supra note 128, at 1072 (arguing that
"[i]f the interest counted as profits, notes would always be securities; if interest did not count as
profits, notes would never be securities").
145. See, e.g., McGinty, supra note 128, at 1072.
146. See, e.g., Sonnenschein, Jr., supra note 144, at 1595 (describing the "profits" and "efforts
of others" prongs as "problematic" in the context of note transactions). Another commentator
observed that because "profits derived from notes are always 'based on the managerial efforts of
others,"' the fourth Howey factor is superfluous. See Janet Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauer, Reves
Revisited, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1123, 1126 (1992).
147. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reification in the Definition of a
Security, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 403, 408 n.17 (1986).
148. The more prescient courts, however, recognized that despite the expansive language in
Forman and Daniel, the Supreme Court could not possibly have intended to apply the Howey test
to notes. See, e.g., Meason v. Bank of Miami, 652 F.2d 542, 550 n.17 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
the Howey test is "of dubious value in [the note] context"); Exch. Nat'l Bank of Chicago v.
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resolved in Reves. 149
After the dust settled from Landreth, it was at least clear that the
Howey investment contract test no longer applied as a whole to stock,
with a strong implication that the test did not apply to the other enumer-
ated security categories. It is much less clear, however, that the inappli-
cability of Howey implied a literal "security" treatment for the other
enumerated categories. This is particularly the case in the context of
employee stock options. There, the so-called "plain terms" approach-
that is, that the plain terms of the definition include any "put," "call," or
"option," as well as any "warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase"
any security, is simply too tempting in an analysis of an instrument
denominated an "option."' 50 The fact that employee stock options have
the label "options," combined with the fact that they share some charac-
teristics of ordinary stock options, probably contributes to the lack of
scholarly dissent on the "security" status of employee stock options.
This literalist approach, although seductive to courts, commenta-
tors, and practitioners, is belied by the Supreme Court's approach to the
definitional provisions. In Forman, for example, the Court plainly con-
sidered and rejected what the Court itself called the "'literal approach'
to defining a security,"' 5 ' and that rejection occurred in the context of an
instrument called "stock"-the "paradigm" of a security. The Court in
that case invoked the venerable aphorism: "[a] thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."'' 52 Even Landreth, which
may be regarded as the Supreme Court's best example of literalism in
this area, expressly left "until another day the question whether 'notes'
or 'bonds' or some other category of instrument listed in the definition
might be shown 'by proving [only] the document itself."" 53 In fact, the
Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1976); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155,
1168 (S.D. Iowa 1981) ("[lIt would be difficult if not impossible to fit any note, debenture or even
preferred stock within that framework.").
149. See infra Part III.B.
150. The superficiality of this approach is particularly stark when the reader considers that in
fact employee stock options would more plausibly qualify as "warrants" or "rights" than as
"options." In the financial community, the instruments commonly called "employee stock
options" are really "warrants." See, e.g., SIMON Z. BENNINGA & ODED SARIG, CORPORATE
FINANCE: A VALUATION APPROACH 374 (1996) ("When an option is written by an investor, it is
simply called an option. When the firm whose stock is the underlying asset writes the option, we
call the option a warrant."). The exercise of a warrant causes the number of shares of a firm
outstanding to increase, while the exercise of an option only effects a transfer of already
outstanding shares. See id.
151. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975).
152. Id. at 849 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892)).
153. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985). With respect to "notes," the
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Court there expressly cautioned that "'stock' may be viewed as being in
a category by itself,"1 54 and "may be distinguishable from most if not all
of the other categories listed in the Acts' definition."' 55 That statement
by the Court, although largely neglected, is crucial; the Court straight-
forwardly stated that the notion that a security may be found "by proving
the document itself' is not applicable to "most if not all" of the other
statutory categories.
Once satisfied that the plain terms approach is not controlling as to
the general definition of a security, but is controlling for stock, the sec-
ond possible approach would be to treat stock options as securities on
the rationale that stock options are somehow analytically identical to
stock. The rationale would be that since stock has special status as the
"paradigm" of a security, a stock option-that is, a contract to acquire
stock-ought to have a special securities law status too. This was
roughly the approach taken in One-O-One Enterprises v. Caruso.'5 6 In
that case, then-Circuit Judge Ginsburg invoked the traditional/non-tradi-
tional dichotomy of Landreth, concluding that "It]he option to purchase
stock, it seems to us, is such a traditional securities instrument that its
existence may be shown 'by proving the document itself.' ""' Judge
Ginsburg then proceeded to the conclusion that the right to purchase
stock should "be subject to the same test for application of the securities
laws as [stock] itself."' 58
Court subsequently answered this question in the negative-i.e., that "notes" could not be shown
by proving "the document itself." See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1990).
154. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694.
155. Id. at 693.
156. 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
157. Id. at 1288.
158. As support for this proposition, the court cited the statement of Blue Chip Stamps that "[a]
contract to purchase or sell securities is expressly defined by § 3(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a), as a purchase or sale of securities for the purpose of that Act." Id. (citing Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750-51 (1975)). But that statement in Blue Chip
Stamps only observed that a contract to purchase or sell, including a put, call, or other option,
constitutes a "purchase or sale" of the underlying security, not that such a put, call, or other option
is itself a security, and certainly not that a contract to purchase a security is subject to the same
test for security status as the underlying security itself. Justice Ginsburg's observation is
particularly unfortunate not only because it has been cited as authority for treating stock options as
stock, but also because Justice Ginsburg explicitly acknowledged that the security question "[did]
not affect the outcome of this appeal." See id. at 1284. Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg is not the
first to have misread the Blue Chip Stamps case as determining whether a security was involved,
as opposed to whether a "purchase" or "sale" was involved. One particularly troubling district
court opinion actually replaced the Blue Chip Stamps language that "the holders of puts, calls,
options, and other contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities have been recognized
as 'purchasers' or 'sellers' of securities for the purposes of Rule 10b-5" with the inaccurate
paraphrase, "puts, calls, options, and other contractual rights to purchase or sell securities have
been recognized as [securities under the federal securities laws]." Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
507 F. Supp. 1225, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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The problem with the One-O-One Enterprises approach is that
employee stock options are not stock, but only contractual rights to
acquire stock. In fact, for this reason the argument made by the One-O-
One Enterprises court actually cuts both ways. That is, the court argued
that stock options should be per se securities because they are rights to
acquire stock and stock is "in a category by itself."' 59 But, we might
just as easily point out that stock options are not stock and stock is "in a
category by itself." Even in the context of instruments that were actu-
ally called shares of "stock," the court stated that "the fact that instru-
ments bear the label 'stock' is not of itself sufficient to invoke the
coverage of the Acts. [W]e must also determine whether those instru-
ments possess 'some of the significant characteristics typically associ-
ated with' stock."' 6° After all, if we are to invoke the special status of
stock to establish the security character of employee stock options, those
options should at least meet the same test we would apply to stock.
The One-O-One Enterprises analysis, however, fails on its own
terms in this regard, as employee stock options have virtually none of
the characteristics of stock. The Supreme Court itself identified the
characteristics of "traditional stock" as: (1) the right to receive dividends
contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (2) negotiability; (3) the
ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (4) the conferring of voting rights
in proportion to the number of shares owned; and (5) the capacity to
appreciate in value.' 6' Stock options, like the "stock" in Forman, "lack
what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed the most common feature of
stock: the right to receive 'dividends contingent upon an apportionment
of profits.' 162 Employee stock options also are not negotiable and nor-
mally may not be pledged or hypothecated. 163 Further, employee stock
options have no voting rights, leaving only the capacity to appreciate in
value as their common characteristic with traditional stock.
Lest the reader be tempted to take a "one out of five ain't bad"
approach to the "traditional stock" analysis, it is important to consider
the ramifications of letting the other four factors slide. If we allowed the
capacity to appreciate in value alone to convince us that something is
"traditional stock," then virtually every conceivable piece of personal or
real property could constitute "traditional stock."' 164 The realist in the
159. One-O-One Enterprises, 848 F.2d at 1288.
160. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
161. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975).
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163. See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of
Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 460 (2000) ("Option plans usually prevent
executives from pledging their grants. [T]he option is not usable collateral.").
164. In fact, such property also generally has the characteristic of the "ability to be pledged or
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audience might exclaim that such other pieces of property are not even
called "stock." The fact is, though, that neither are employee stock
options. While this argument does not, by itself, dispel the argument
that "warrants," "rights," and "options" are expressly included in the
definition of "security," it does dispel the argument that they should be
included in the special per se security category of "traditional stock."
B. Reves v. Ernst & Young and the Second-Level
Context Clause Test
1. REREADING REVES
The question remained after Forman, Daniel, and Landreth
whether any elements of the Howey test survived outside the context of
investment contracts. The Landreth Court, after all, clearly cautioned
that the Howey test, at least as an integral whole, should not apply to
other enumerated categories of securities. But the Court's indication
that all of the Howey factors would not be relevant to all of the other
enumerated instruments did not necessarily imply that none of the
Howey factors would be relevant to any of the other instruments. Specif-
ically, the Court did not clarify whether the absence of an "investment"
could remove an instrument not only from the "investment contract"
rubric, but also from the other enumerated categories, such as "bonds,"
"options," or "notes." Nor did the Court resolve the broader question of
whether any contextual inquiry, whether related to Howey or not, could
suffice to remove an instrument falling within an enumerated category
of security from the scope of the term "security."
The answer to both questions depended on the Court's resolution of
the interpretive dispute over the prefatory language, "unless the context
otherwise requires," that qualifies the definitional provisions in the
Securities Acts. At issue is whether this so-called "context clause"
refers only to the textual context of the Acts themselves or more broadly
to the underlying factual context of the transaction at issue.'65 If the
context clause language refers "only to the statutory context," as many
commentators have contended,166 then that clause would not support
hypothecated," and accordingly would have two of the five characteristics, compared with stock
options' one of five.
165. This issue was discussed in detail in Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.
1984), affid sub nom., Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985), in which the Court of Appeals
opted for the narrower, "textual" interpretation of the context clause with respect to "stock."
166. Professor Rosin is one of several commentators who have argued for the narrower,
"textual" interpretation of the context clause. See generally Gary S. Rosin, Functional Exclusions
from the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L. REv. 333 (1986) [hereinafter Rosin, Functional
Exclusions]. In contrast, Professor Loss argues that there is "support in the legislative history of
the Securities Act for the view that 'context' refers more broadly to the surrounding factual
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"judicial exclusions of securities from the scope of the Act when the
'factual circumstances' seem to warrant it.' 167 If, on the other hand, the
context clause language refers more broadly to the underlying factual
circumstances of the transaction at issue, that clause would provide at
least a plausible statutory basis for so-called "functional" exclusions
from securities law coverage.
The Supreme Court resolved the context clause issue without even
mentioning the clause in Reves v. Ernst & Young.' 68 In that case, the
Court was called upon to decide whether certain promissory notes issued
by a farmers' cooperative constituted securities within the meaning of
the Exchange Act. 169 Justice Marshall, assuming Justice Powell's role
as the Court's definition-of-security expositor, considered the top three
tests established in the circuit courts to ascertain whether "notes" are
securities. These tests included: (1) the Howey investment contract test,
which some circuits had adopted from the "investment contract" con-
text; (2) the "family resemblance" test, which compared a particular note
to a "judicially-crafted list of exceptions" from the definition of a secur-
ity; and (3) the "investment versus commercial" test, which distin-
guished notes issued in an investment context from notes issued in a
commercial or consumer context. 7 ° The Court officially opted for the
"family resemblance" test, although it regarded the "investment versus
commercial" test as embodying the "same general approach."' 7'
The Reves Court sorted through the ambiguous language in Lan-
dreth and resolved the context clause dispute in favor of the functionalist
and "contextualist" approach and against the literalist or "textualist"
interpretation. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, explained that it
is the presence of an "investment" that is "the fundamental essence of a
'security.' "T172 In Justice Marshall's view, "Congress' purpose in enact-
ing the securities laws was to regulate investments," and in determining
whether a particular transaction involves an investment, courts are not
circumstances of a transaction alleged to involve a security." Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at
928. Professor Loss bases this interpretation in part on the fact that "[e]arly versions of the 1933
bills said: 'unless the text otherwise indicates.'" Id. at 928 n. 14. Professor Rosin's article retorts
that "[tihe adoption in the 1933 and 1934 Acts of the phrase 'unless the context otherwise
requires' reflects nothing more than differences in choice of drafting sources," meaning the choice
of the English Companies Act definition section over that drafted by Huston Thompson. See
Rosin, Functional Exclusions, supra, at 580-82, 597. While this interpretive matter of legislative
history may continue to occupy commentators, its ultimate resolution is moot as the Supreme
Court has opted for the "factual context" approach. See infra Part IlI.C.
167. Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320, 331 (3d Cir. 1984).
168. 494 U.S. 56 (1989).
169. Id. at 58.
170. Id. at 63-65.
171. Id. at 64-65.
172. Id. at 68-69.
1226 [Vol. 57:1195
2003] EMPLOYEE INCENTIVES AND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 1227
"bound by legal formalisms, but instead take account of the economics
of the transaction under investigation."' 7 3 Distinguishing the literalist
and anti-contextualist approach of Landreth, the Court made it perfectly
clear that the only reason the instruments in Landreth were not subject to
"case-by-case analysis" on the basis of economic reality was precisely
because those instruments were "by their nature investments."'74 In the
Court's view, "stock is, as a practical matter, always an investment if it
has the economic characteristics traditionally associated with stock."'
' 75
The Reves Court, therefore, expressly confirmed what the Daniel Court
had suggested-that the "fundamental essence" of a security is an
investment.
The next component of the Reves Court's opinion, though, has gen-
erated more controversy than the widely overlooked "investment"
requirement. Justice Marshall did not merely name the "family resem-
blance" notes that did not constitute "securities" under the adopted Sec-
ond Circuit test, he further explained "what it is about [the family
resemblance] instruments that makes them non-'securities. ' "176 Here,
Justice Marshall articulated a four-factor test to distinguish non-securi-
ties from securities, requiring courts to:
[1] examine the transaction to assess the motivations that would
prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it. If the seller's
purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business enterprise
or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested pri-
marily in the profit the note is expected to generate, the instrument is
likely to be a "security." If the note is exchanged to facilitate the
purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct for
the seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other commer-
cial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the note is less sensibly
described as a "security."...
[2] ... examine the "plan of distribution" of the instrument to deter-
mine whether it is an instrument in which there is "common trading
for speculation or investment."
[3] . .. examine the reasonable expectations of the investing public:
The Court will consider instruments to be "securities" on the basis of
such public expectations, even where an economic analysis of the
circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the
instruments are not "securities" as used in that transaction.
[4] ... examine whether some factor such as the existence of another
regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument,
173. Id. at 61.
174. Id. at 62.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 65-66.
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thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary. 77
This generic four-factor test has been nearly unanimously regarded
by courts and commentators as a specialized test for determining
whether notes and other debt instruments constitute securities. 78 There
is a strong argument, however, on the basis of the language and reason-
ing of the Reves case, that the four-factor test should serve to determine
whether any enumerated instrument is a security, not merely whether a
"note" is a security. Yet, no federal court has seriously discussed the
possibility that the Reves test might be applied to securities generally,
179
and the corpus of scholarly commentary fares only slightly better in this
regard. While a handful of commentators have suggested that the Reves
test may be applied to securities generally, none have systematically
analyzed the Reves case to ascertain whether that reading is correct.180
In spite of the scant attention this aspect of the Reves case has received,
this pretermitted issue regarding the scope of the Reves test could pro-
vide the universal test for the presence of a "security" that commentators
and courts have struggled to reach for over a half century.
The first incongruity that casts suspicion on the interpretation of
Reves as a specialized test for notes is obvious from the face of the four-
factor test itself. None of the factors articulated by the Reves Court
seems to have any particular relevance to notes, as opposed to invest-
ment contracts, stock, or any other enumerated instrument. The test con-
tains none of the debt-specific components of the "risk capital" test, such
as the time to maturity, the degree of collateralization, or the amount
borrowed.' 8' One could, in fact, envision the four-factor test applying
177. Id. at 66-67 (citations omitted).
178. See McGinty, supra note 128, at 1075 (arguing that Reves presented the four factor test
"as the 'real' way to separate notes that were securities from those that were not"). But see Marc
I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company as a Security, 19 PEPP. L. REV.
1105, 1121 (1992) (applying Reves to LLC interests).
179. The farthest the federal courts have ventured in extending the Reves test is to apply the
test to unusual debt-like instruments like post-dated checks. See Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954
F.2d 278, 284-85 (5th Cit. 1992).
180. Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of the Antifraud
Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 255
(1992); Marc I. Steinberg, Notes as Securities: Reves and its Implications, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 675,
679 (1990) ("If any applicable standard has widespread application in the definition of 'security'
setting, it is the 'family resemblance' test.").
181. See, e.g., Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1976). The
similarity to Kotz's specialized note test is particularly stark in light of the fact that that case
described "time" as the "most important factor." Id. "Time" or "maturity" are factors normally
only relevant to debt-like securities, which ordinarily are finite-life instruments. While options
also have a finite life, in the sense that they ultimately expire, the "time to maturity" analysis is
completely inapposite because the time to "maturity" of an option benefits the holder of the
option, not the issuer. Although the Reves Court did mention the debt-specific issue of
collateralization in connection with the "risk-reducing" factor, it did so not in its general
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equally well to bonds, stocks, or even the ultra-generic category of
investment contracts. The general and unspecific nature of the Reves
test stands in stark contrast to the Forman test for "stock," which con-
tained some factors that could only apply to stock. 
182
The scholarly commentary, sensing this incongruity, has expressed
a generalized dissatisfaction with the four-factor test. Leading commen-
tators have called the test "troublesome"' 83 and have lambasted the
Reves Court for articulating factors that seem "arbitrarily plucked" from
the Court's precedents.' 84 This dissatisfaction with the four-fadtor test
results, at least in large part, from the failure to apprehend and answer
one simple rhetorical question: if the Reves four-factor test is so poorly
adapted to notes, has no particular relevance to debt securities generally,
and would apply arbitrarily well to any other enumerated category of
security, then what makes us believe that the Reves test should be
regarded as a specialized test for notes?
The answer is, of course, that the instrument at issue in the case
was denominated a "note," and the Court's decision was made in the
context of an inter-circuit split over the securities law treatment of notes.
The Court also made statements that sealed the test to notes, such as
prescribing that, "in determining whether an instrument denominated a
'note' is a 'security,' courts are to apply the version of the 'family
resemblance' test that we have articulated here." '85 Furthermore, the
Court's own statement of the holding emphasized the connection of the
test to notes: "[w]e therefore hold that the notes at issue here are within
the term 'note' in [Section] 3(a)(10).' 86 Despite these note-specific
statements, however, the language, structure, and context of the Reves
opinion as a whole reveal that the four-factor test has a broader applica-
tion than the narrow "note" context of Reves.
The language used throughout by the Reves court reveals that the
test was regarded neither as a novel test nor as a note-specific test. The
Reves opinion introduced the four factors by describing them as those
(supposedly) applied by the Second Circuit in formulating the family
resemblance list. More importantly, though, the Court described those
factors as "the same factors that this Court has held apply in deciding
exposition of the four-factor test, but as a particular application of the fourth factor to the
instruments at issue in the case-i.e., notes. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 69.
182. These include the first factor ("the right to receive dividends") and the third factor
("voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned"). See supra note 161 and
accompanying text.
183. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 951.
184. McGinty, supra note 128, at 1075.
185. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
186. Id. at 70. Note that the Court actually stated the holding differently at the end of the case.
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whether a transaction involves a 'security.' ,,"87 Significantly, the Court
did not say that those factors were the same factors it had applied in
deciding whether a transaction involves a "note," nor could it. That is
because the Court cited precedent for each of the four factors, and none
of the cases cited as precedent were cases construing the term "notes."' 88
The cases from which the four factors were drawn used those factors in
the course of construing other categories of enumerated instruments,
including stock, investment contracts, and the other catchall category
known as "any other instrument commonly known as a security," which
underlies the allegation that the Court "arbitrarily plucked" the factors
from prior case law. In fact, the Court did not even mention the term
"note" in the main text of the four-factor test itself, but only in the illus-
trative portion of one of the factors of the test, explaining the proper
application of the factor to the notes at issue in the case.' 89
On these bases alone, an argument could be made that the Reves
test sets forth the characteristics common to securities generally, not
merely to notes. It would defy credulity for the Court to select four
factors from prior cases unrelated to notes, present those four factors
together as a unified test, and then contend that those factors were actu-
ally a specialized test for notes, inapplicable to the instruments that
spawned them.' 90 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Reves
analysis was not the result of the peculiar analysis of a single Justice, or
even of a majority of the Justices. This portion of the opinion was unan-
imous-joined even by the four Justices who dissented from the Court's
actual holding. If the Court had not, in fact, intended to apply the Reves
187. id. at 66 (emphasis added).
188. For the first factor, the Court cited Forman, which involved the construction of the terms
"stock" and "investment contract." See id. at 66. For the second factor, the Court cited Joiner,
which involved the construction of the terms "investment contracts" and "any interest or
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' See id. For the third factor, the Court cited
Landreth, which involved the construction of the terms "stock" and "investment contract." See id.
at 66-67. For the final factor, the Court cited Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), which
construed the term "instrument commonly known as a 'security."' See id. at 67. See also Adena
Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1250 (5th Cir. 1988).
189. The Court does mention the word "note" three times in connection with the first factor,
though not in the textual description first factor itself, but rather in the two explanatory sentences
that follow the factor. Throughout the test, the Court used the term "instrument," the Court's
generic term for any purported security. In total, the word "note" appears only three times and
"instrument" appears six times.
190. Despite the fact that the court abstracted the four-part test entirely from non-note cases,
courts and commentators appear to have universally limited the Reves test to notes and similar
instruments, and have not even considered it as the test for a "security" generally. See, e.g., Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 925 ("There is no universal or generic test of the term [security].").
Despite the scholarly emphasis on the distinctiveness of the analysis for the individual enumerated
categories, some commentators have observed that the Reves factors, among others, have common
elements that underlie most of the Court's decisions on the definition of a "security." See
generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 20.
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test outside the context of "notes," then it would be difficult to imagine
that not a single Justice in this splintered decision would have registered
an objection to the majority's expansive language.
The most compelling piece of evidence supporting the principle
that Reves applies outside the narrow context of notes depends on an
issue not expressly discussed in the Reves case itself. That issue is
whether an instrument that fails the Reves test implies only that the
instrument is not a "note," or whether failing the Reves test implies that
the instrument is not a "security." If failing the Reves test medns only
that an instrument is not a "note," then because almost any instrument
failing the test would have a possibility of still qualifying as an "invest-
ment contract," '191 a second-stage investment contract analysis would be
necessary to determine whether the instrument was nevertheless a secur-
ity by virtue of being an investment contract. 9 ' But if failing the Reves
test means not only that an instrument is not a "note," but also that an
instrument is not a "security," then there would be no need to examine
whether the instrument qualified as any other enumerated category, such
as an "investment contract."' 93 Therefore, if the Reves test is sufficient
to remove a particular note from the definition of a "security" as
opposed to merely removing an instrument from the definition of a note,
then that test must also be sufficient to determine that the instrument is
not a security by virtue of any other enumerated category as well, with-
out recourse to any second-stage investment contract analysis.
While the Court in Reves did not explicitly discuss the possibility
of a second-stage inquiry, there is limited support from subsequent juris-
prudence and commentary that a second-stage inquiry would be appro-
priate. The lower federal courts have not, at least in an explicit manner,
explored the question of whether a second-stage analysis is necessary
when an instrument fails the Reves test. Nevertheless, some courts,
while not making the conceptual distinction between a finding of a
"non-note" and a finding of a "non-security," have treated Howey and
Reves as alternative bases for finding the existence of a security,
94
implying that a second-stage approach would be appropriate. A few
191. This would be particularly true in those circuits that do not require so-called "horizontal
commonality" to find an investment contract. The requirement of horizontal commonality would
stymie security treatment for the large population of notes that are negotiated individually between
the buyer and the seller, independent of any other similar notes.
192. This approach was illustrated in the Forman case where "[t]he Court first held that the
'shares' did not fall within the category stock .... Second, the Court held that the shares did not
fall within the investment contracts category." Chang, supra note 147, at 441.
193. In Marine Bank, for example, the Court held that the "context otherwise required" with
respect to the instruments at issue and accordingly did not examine the instruments under the
Howey test. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982).
194. See, e.g., Reeder v. Succession of Palmer, 736 F. Supp. 128, 130-32 (E.D. La. 1990). As
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courts, evidently relying on the stated holding in Reves, 195 have con-
cluded that the Reves test is a "method for determining whether an
instrument called a note was a note."'' 96 Furthermore, one commenta-
tor's article actually considered whether a second-stage investment con-
tract analysis was necessary and concluded that Reves supported such a
second-stage inquiry. 97 When taken with the Reves Court's stated hold-
ing that "the notes at issue here are within the term 'note,"'198 one could
conclude that an instrument that failed the "family resemblance" test
could still qualify as a security under second-stage investment contract
analysis.
The evidence taken as a whole, however, refutes the proposition
that an instrument failing the Reves test would require the application of
a second-stage Howey analysis. The reason is that the family resem-
blance test was presented as a test for determining whether an instru-
ment, including a note, is a "security," not whether a purported note was
in fact a "note." In spite of the confusing "holding" of Reves, the
explicit language throughout the opinion, 99 from the first sentence 200 to
the antepenultimate sentence,20 1 was cast in terms of whether an ostensi-
bly enumerated instrument was, in fact, a security. This is further sup-
ported by the Second Circuit's list of "family resemblance" instruments,
which was introduced as "instruments commonly denominated 'notes'
noted above, treating Reves and Howey as alternative bases for finding a security presupposes that
the four-factor test does not remove an instrument from the scope of the term security.
195. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
196. In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 884, 888 (W.D. Mich. 1991); see also
Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (using Reves to hold that
particular instruments were "'notes' within the meaning of the securities acts").
197. See Dennis S. Corgill, Securities as Investments at Risk, 67 TUL. L. REV. 861, 896-903
(1993). Professor Corgill acknowledged, as I have, that the Reves Court "did not indicate whether
further analysis would be appropriate if the notes failed the family resemblance test." Id. at 898.
Analogizing to Forman, however, Professor Corgill concluded that the Reves Court would have
applied a second-stage Howey test as the Forman Court did. This analysis, however, conflicts
with the language and structure of the Reves opinion. See infra notes 199-2 10 and accompanying
text.
198. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 70 (1990).
199. See, e.g., id. at 60 ("This case requires us to decide whether the note issued by the Co-Op
is a 'security.'"); id. at 65 ("We agree that the items identified by the Second Circuit are not
properly viewed as 'securities.'"); id. at 67 ("[I]n determining whether an instrument denominated
a 'note' is a 'security,' courts are to apply the version of the 'family resemblance' test that we
have articulated here."); id. ("[A] note is presumed to be a 'security,' and that presumption may be
rebutted."); id. ("[W]e have little difficulty in concluding that the notes at issue here are
'securities.' ").
200. See id. at 58 ("This case presents the question whether certain demand notes ...are
'securities' within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.").
201. See id. at 73 ("[W]e conclude that the demand notes at issue here fall under the 'note'
category of instruments that are 'securities' under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.").
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that nonetheless fall without the 'security' category, '"202 not as "instru-
ments denominated 'notes' that nonetheless fall without the 'note' cate-
gory." In addition, the Court agreed with the Second Circuit "that the
items identified by the Second Circuit are not properly viewed as 'secur-
ities.' ,20 3 This judicial language demonstrates that the Court set forth a
test that would distinguish notes that were securities from those that
were not.2°
The Second Circuit jurisprudence from which Reves copied its
"family resemblance test" answers definitively both the effect 'and the
statutory basis of the test. In Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.,205 one of the cases from which Reves drew its test, the Second Cir-
cuit appeals court did have occasion to determine whether a second-
stage Howey inquiry was necessary. There, the court found that the
notes at issue were not securities because the "context otherwise
require[d] "°206 The court did not proceed to an investment contract anal-
ysis, 207 as it would have if it had held merely that the notes were not
"notes," as opposed to holding the notes were not "securities." The Sec-
ond Circuit's explicit statutory basis for that conclusion was the context
clause.20 8 The approach of Reves, like that taken in the Second Circuit,
has overwhelmingly been regarded as a test for whether a "note" consti-
tutes a "security, ' 20 9 not whether a note constitutes a "note." And while
202. Id. at 65.
203. Id.
204. In this regard, the Reves approach is a different type of analysis from that in Forman.
Although the Forman Court did not explicitly say that it was holding that the stock there was not
"stock" within the meaning of the definition, the Landreth Court subsequently so characterized the
Forman holding. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691 n.5 (1985) (explaining
that "once the label 'stock' did not hold true" in Forman, the Court applied the Howey test to the
security catchall categories).
205. 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984).
206. Id. at 937.
207. Id. at 939.
208. Id. at 936-37.
209. See, e.g., Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Developments in Trading Claims:
Participations and Disputed Claims, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 733, 751 (1993) (noting that the Reves
factors "determine whether a debt instrument constitutes a security"); Larry E. Ribstein, Private
Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1,
59 (1992) (noting that the Reves Court "articulated standards for determining when 'notes' were
not securities"); Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual
Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2350 (1996) ("[Tlests adopted under
Reves to determine whether or not a 'note' would constitute a "security.'"); Anupam Chandler,
Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1076 (2001) ("Reves Court decided "whether an
instrument bearing the name 'note' is a security."); C. Steven Bradford, Expanding the Investment
Company Act: The SEC's Manipulation of the Definition of Security, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 995, 1020
n.152 (noting that Reves determines "whether a note is a security"); Kerr & Eisenhauer, supra
note 146, at 1129 (discussing how Reves "set down a uniform test for determining which notes are
securities").
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the majority opinion in Reves never mentioned the context clause, it is
likely that the Reves Court, like the Second Circuit, was applying a con-
text clause analysis in deciding whether a "note" was a "security.
210
The four-factor "family resemblance" analysis in Reves, therefore,
is a test for determining whether the "context ... requires" that an enu-
merated instrument be treated as a non-security. As indicated above, the
fact that the "context" can remove an instrument from the definition of a
security by virtue of that instrument being a "note" means that the same
context necessarily must be able to remove the instrument from the defi-
nition of a security by virtue of that instrument qualifying as a "bond," a
"debenture," or an "investment contract." That fact, taken in conjunc-
tion with the Reves Court's sweeping statements about the test it articu-
lated, counsels the conclusion that the Reves test, like the context clause
on which that test is predicated, qualifies each of the enumerated catego-
ries of "security," not merely the category of "notes."
2. REVES AND OPTIONS: DOES THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRE?
The securities law status of broad-based employee stock options,
while seemingly settled in the minds of many securities practitioners, is
not at all free from doubt after Reves. The status of broad-based
employee stock options has not been authoritatively decided by the
courts, 21 1 and the legislative history of the Acts provides little useful
guidance. 212 The analysis of the Reves Court, however, does provide
210. See McGinty, supra note 128, at 1085 n.216.
The context clause was the only plausible mechanism for reconciling Reves' multi-
factored test with the Acts' statutory language. The context clause was omitted
from Reves presumably because its credibility had been severely damaged by
criticisms of its misuse in Weaver and by its association with the sale of business
doctrine and with overreaching judicial exclusions generally.
Id.; see also Larry D. Soderquist, A Paradigm from Securities Law of Uninformed Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 497, 502 (2000) (describing Reves as a case "in which
the Court did decide a 'what is a security' issue by reference to the 'unless the context otherwise
requires' proviso").
211. Only a few federal cases appear to have squarely faced the question of whether employee
stock options are securities for the purposes of the Securities Acts. See Collins v. Rukin, 342 F.
Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972) (holding that executive stock options were securities); Fenoglio v.
Augat, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d. 46, 58 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding stock options were securities,
relying, without analysis, on Collins); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 380 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) ("It is axiomatic that ... an option agreement is a security under the 1934 Act."). The
Collins case has unfortunately been relied on as authority that stock options are securities, even
though that case did no more than decline to hold, as a matter of law, that the employment context
there described "require[d] that the explicit inclusion of stock options in the definitional sections
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts be disregarded." Collins, 342 F. Supp. at 1288. In the Globus case, the
purported security was an option granted to executive officers, not part of a broad-based option
plan. See Globus, 271 F. Supp. at 379 (granting options to president and chief executive officer of
company).
212. One piece of legislative history could be interpreted as supporting the contrary
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useful guidance. The Reves Court based its family resemblance exclu-
sionary analysis on the fact that notes "are used in a variety of settings,
not all of which involve investments. 2t 3 The enumerated categories of
"options," "rights," and "warrants" are equally broad in terms of the
variety of transactions they encompass. They range from options instru-
ments traded on organized exchanges, to complicated instruments nego-
tiated among financial institutions, to the employee stock options that
are an increasingly common component of employee compensation.
The motivation underlying the creation of options, warrants, and rights
is different in each of these contexts. The four factors of Reves, when
applied to the context of broad-based, non-transferable employee stock
options, suggest that many such options are not "securities" for purposes
of the federal securities laws.
a. Motivations of Reasonable Seller and Buyer
The analysis of these instruments begins with the first Reves factor,
which requires an examination of the motivations of "reasonable seller
and buyer" in entering into the transaction. According to the Court, the
crucial inquiry is what motivation, in the particular factual setting of
employee stock options, "would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to
enter into" an employment relationship in which an employee surrenders
his or her labor for a compensation package that includes stock options.
That inquiry, viewed through the lens of the "entire transaction"
approach, compels the conclusion that the motivations underlying grants
of broad-based employee stock options are those of incentive and com-
proposition. This blurb was described in the Daniel case as "the rejection by Congress in 1934 of
an amendment to the Securities Act that would have exempted employee stock investment and
stock option plans from the Act's registration requirements." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 563 (1979). The amendment would have added to Section 4(1) of the Securities
Act the language:
As used in this paragraph, the term 'public offering shall not be deemed to include
an offering made solely to employees by an issuer or by its affiliates in connection
with a bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or stock investment
plan for the exclusive benefit of such employees.
78 CONG. REc. 8708 (1934). The implication, of course, is that Congress would have had no need
to exempt a "bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or stock investment plan" if
such plans did not constitute "securities." The Daniel Court, however, determined that "[t]he
legislative history of the defeated proposal indicates it was intended to cover plans under which
employees contributed their own funds to a segregated investment account on which a return was
realized." Daniel, 439 U.S. at 563-64. Regardless of whether the Court's interpretation of
legislative history is correct, this proposed amendment has no bearing on the analysis of this
argument. The amendment would have exempted such plans from the registration provisions of
the Securities Act, which require "value" for a sale. Under circumstances where "value" exists, the
analysis of this article agrees that there would normally be an "investment."
213. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990).
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pensation, not of capital-raising and investment.2 14
The mere language of "seller and buyer" in the Reves test is awk-
ward enough in the context of employee stock options as to suggest their
non-security character.21 5  From the perspective of the employer
"seller," the purpose of stock options is not to "raise money for the gen-
eral use of a business or to finance substantial investments," but to pro-
vide performance incentives and foster loyalty among employees. After
all, the grant of stock options raises no capital for the company,216 and
even the exercise of options results in a capital inflow less than (or pos-
sibly equal to) the fair market value of the stock.217 In fact, the seller's
non-capital-raising motivation in the compensatory context is so plain
that even the Commission itself has acknowledged that "[i]n a bona fide
compensatory arrangement, the issuer is concerned primarily with com-
pensating the employee-investor rather than maximizing its proceeds
from the sale."2t 8
One could, of course, argue that options are an alternative to paying
cash compensation, thereby indirectly freeing up capital. If that were
the test, though, even the non-security "notes" for which the test was
designed would fail. After all, even when a "note is exchanged to facili-
tate the purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct
for the seller's cash-flow difficulties," examples of non-securities under
Reves, those transactions are ordinarily undertaken with the specific pur-
pose of freeing up liquidity for other uses. In any event, any capital
"freed up" by the employee stock option would be for the specific pur-
pose of compensation, not for the "general use of a business."
The motivations of the employee "buyer" similarly militate against
security treatment. The reasonable rank-and-file employee cannot be
214. Even the Commission acknowledges the distinction between sales for "compensatory and
incentive purposes" and sales for "capital-raising" purposes. See, e.g., Exempt Offerings Pursuant
to Compensatory Arrangements, Securities Act Release No. 33-7645, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,115, at 81,777 (Feb. 25, 1999) [hereinafter Release 7645].
215. Some might argue that the awkwardness of the language militates against the application
of the Reves test rather than against the classification of options as securities under the test. The
Reves language about a "reasonable seller and buyer," however, is equally awkward in the context
of a note delivered in the context of consumer purchase on credit. Yet such transactions are
exactly the type of "family resemblance" notes that the Reves test was designed to identify as non-
securities. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 65.
216. It is true that the exercise of stock options may result (depending on mode of exercise) in
a capital inflow to the company. This inflow, however, is more properly associated with the
exercise of the options than their grant. The exercise is separately subject to the Securities Acts,
regardless of whether the options themselves constitute "securities."
217. This is because a rational employee would only exercise stock options if the value of the
stock underlying the options is greater than or equal to the exercise price the employee is required
to pay.
218. See Release 7645, supra note 214, at 81,780.
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said to have surrendered his labor "primarily" for "the profit the [option]
is likely to generate," but rather to earn a day-to-day livelihood, which is
to come primarily from salary or wages. The Court calls upon us to
"examine the transaction," not merely the instrument itself, to assess the
motivations of "a reasonable buyer and seller to enter into it." The only
separable "transaction" at issue in employee stock option cases is the
employment relationship. The temptation should be resisted to look
only at the option grant itself, as that is not a "transaction" that the
employer and employee "enter into," but rather it is the exchange of
labor for a compensation package that may only incidentally include a
stock option.
As Daniel observed, such an employee is "selling his labor prima-
rily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment."'219 This factor
bears more than a passing similarity to the first factor of the Howey test;
both question whether the acquisition of the purported "security" is pri-
marily stimulated by an "investment" motive. This fact has not gone
unnoticed by commentators. 2 0 In fact, the Reves requirement is so sim-
ilar to the first prong of Howey that some commentators have described
the Reves factors as a "reformulation" of the Howey test.221 And as is
the case in the context of the first prong of the Howey test, it would be
difficult to classify employees' labor as an "investment" in most broad-
based employee stock options.
b. Plan of Distribution
The second Reves factor requires the court to "examine the 'plan of
distribution' of the instrument to determine whether it is an instrument
in which there is 'common trading for speculation or investment."'
222
In the context of employee stock options, which are nearly universally
non-transferable, 23 there cannot be "trading" at all, much less "common
trading for speculation or investment." Although it is arguably possible
219. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
220. See Steinberg, supra note 180, at 679 (noting that "in order for a security to exist.., there
must be investment, as compared to commercial, motives underlying the transaction"). According
to Professor Steinberg, this fact "goes to the first prong of the 'family resemblance' test and the
first and third parts of Howey." Id. at n.31.
221. See James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as
Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 403 (1990). Like Professor Steinberg, Professor Gordon
identified the Reves first factor with the Howey "investment of money" prong. See id.
222. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990) (citations omitted).
223. See, e.g., KRAUS, supra note 8, § 6.03[3] ("Executive stock options are almost always
non-transferable except at death to the optionee's estate or heirs."). As is the case with the
requirement that options terminate no later than ninety days after termination of employment, this
characteristic is common in both "incentive stock options" and "non-qualified" stock options,
although technically only required to preserve the tax treatment of incentive stock options. The
notion of a transferable employee stock option, however, would raise numerous problems in
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to characterize a person's choice of employment as "speculation" or
"investment," it would be far-fetched to describe that choice as "trad-
ing." Thus this prong would generally not be met by employee stock
options. Even some of those literalists who advocate looking to the
"instrument" itself, rather than the "transactional" setting of the pur-
ported security, would find instruments to be non-securities on the basis
of their non-transferable nature.
224
The Reves Court, it is true, did not create a particularly tough stan-
dard for this factor, noting that "all we have held to be necessary to
establish the requisite 'common trading' in an instrument" is that the
instrument was "offered and sold to a broad segment of the public. 225
A plausible argument could be made, at least in the context of some
companies, that the company's employees would constitute a "broad
segment of the public. '226  This argument suffers from two principal
weaknesses. First, as discussed above, employee stock options are
nearly always non-transferable. The courts have held non-transferability
in a secondary market to mitigate an instrument's "plan of distribu-
tion." '227 Similarly, courts have regarded the presence or absence of sec-
ondary trading as an important factor.228 Second, as noted earlier,
without a "specific consideration" and an investment decision, there is
no "value" and therefore no "offer" or "sale" of stock options within the
meaning of the Securities Act.229 With no "offers" and no "sales," an
instrument obviously cannot be "offered and sold to a broad segment of
addition to tax treatment, including securities law issues under both state and federal securities
regulations. See id.
224. See FitzGibbon, supra note 17, at 926 (arguing that an instrument "is not a security if it is
not 'eligible' to be bought and sold in open or public markets"). For this reason, Professor
FitzGibbon described as "notable exclusions from the category of 'securities,'" those "employee
benefit plans when ... the instruments (the interests in the benefit funds) must be acquired largely
in exchange for labor for a particular employer." See id. at 930-31.
225. Reves, 494 U.S. at 68.
226. This is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Ralston Purina, where the
Court observed that absent "special circumstances, employees are just as much members of the
investing 'public' as any of their neighbors in the community." SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S.
119, 126 (1953).
227. See, e.g., Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 973 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir.
1992) (holding that the absence of a secondary market "worked to prevent the loan participations
from being sold to the general public, thus limiting eligible buyers to those with the capacity to
acquire information about the debtor").
228. See Stoiber v. SEC, 161 F.3d 745, 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
229. See supra Part lI.B.2.c. The Exchange Act has a similar definition of "sale" that does not
contain a "value" requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (2000). The Supreme Court expressly
reserved in Daniel the question of "whether the meaning of 'sale' under the Securities Exchange
Act is any different from its meaning under the Securities Act." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 556-57 n.8 (1979). It seems likely, however, that the Court used the terms "offered
and sold" as such terms are used in the Securities Act, since the Exchange Act's definitional
section contains no mention of "offer" or "offer to sell."
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the public." Consequently, the "plan of distribution" factor militates
against characterization of employee options as securities under either
approach.
c. Reasonable Expectations of the Investing Public
The third Reves factor, the "reasonable expectations of the invest-
ing public," allows a court to find a security "on the basis of such public
expectations, even where an economic analysis of the circumstances of
the particular transaction might suggest that the instruments are not
'securities' as used in that transaction." 3 This factor emphasizes that
"the fundamental essence of a 'security'" is "its character as an 'invest-
ment."' Nonetheless, the Court has not left us without guidance as to
the meaning of an "investment." As discussed above, the Daniel case
was decided on the basis of the meaning of an "investment" within the
meaning of the Howey test. Although the Reves Court inquiry is not
necessarily controlled by the Howey definition of an investment, Daniel
is the only Supreme Court definition-of-security case that has construed
the term "investment," and accordingly it is the most intuitive starting
point in construing this third Reves factor.2 3'
The use of the Daniel concept of an "investment" to construe the
"fundamental essence" of a security is actually bolstered by the reason-
ing that Reves applied in repudiating the use of the Howey test as a
universal test for finding a security. The Court refused to apply the
Howey test because "[t]o hold that a 'note' is not a 'security' unless it
meets a test designed for an entirely different variety of instrument
'would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments super-
fluous"' and "would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to regulate
the entire body of instruments sold as investments. '2 32
This reasoning, however, provides no support for the rejection of
applying the first prong of the Howey test as the universal definition of
the "investment" that is the "fundamental essence" of a security. First,
requiring all instruments to meet the "investment" prong of Howey
would not make the enumeration of other instruments superfluous
because the investment contract test requires satisfaction of three other
separate prongs.233 Second, it would be difficult to contend that it would
230. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
231. Professor McGinty looked to the presence of "value" in determining whether his version
of an "investment" was present. See McGinty, supra note 128, at 1088. As noted above, see
supra Part II.B.2.c. and accompanying text, the concept of "value" may be treated as identical to
that of an "investment."
232. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692
(1985)).
233. That is, unlike the situation where all instruments were required to satisfy the Howey test
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violate "Congress' intent to regulate the entire body of instruments sold
as investments" to impose a requirement that a security involve an
"investment." Thus, there is little support for the notion that Reves
somehow repudiated the universal "investment" requirement articulated
in Daniel.
In the context of the broad-based stock option plan, the question is
whether the rank-and-file employee (the applicable "investing public")
has "reasonable expectations" that by accepting or retaining employment
s/he is making an "investment" in possible future grants of stock
options. As was the case with the pension benefits in Daniel, broad-
based stock options are part of a larger, indivisible employment relation-
ship.234 As was the case in Daniel, employees do not ordinarily have the
right to bargain for more options by supplying additional labor or fore-
going wages. Conversely, employees do not have the right to forego
stock options in exchange for a higher salary or fewer hours. In fact,
employees normally have no rights in the stock options apart from the
employment relationship, as the options terminate shortly after termina-
tion of employment. 35 The economic reality of broad-based employee
stock options is that the rank-and-file employee surrenders "his labor as
a whole" in exchange for a total compensation package including option
grants dependent more on the compensation policy of the employer than
on the success of the company.
Moreover, unlike the notes at issue in Reves, the employment rela-
tionship is not typically marketed as an "investment." There is certainly
an investment component to any employment relationship, whether
involving equity compensation or not. Even an employee who does not
receive equity compensation in some sense "invests" in the prospects of
the company. An employee who parts with one job for another risks
layoffs, salary cuts, or even possible insolvency, all of which are directly
or indirectly related to the success of the company and could have a
considerable effect on the value of the employment relationship. But in
the Daniel case, there was substantially more of an "investment" compo-
nent than these speculative concerns, as even the Court itself implicitly
acknowledged.236 Daniel nowhere provides that the presence of an
in its entirety (i.e., required to be investment contracts) to achieve "security" status, requiring all
instruments to involve an "investment" would not require that those instruments be investment
contracts in order to be "securities."
234. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
235. Many option plans have exceptions in the case of retirement, death, or disability, but those
limited exceptions can hardly contribute to the "investment" character of the options.
236. See, e.g., Soderquist, supra note 210, at 501. Professor Soderquist notes that:
In finding the "investment" element missing . . . the [Daniel] Court merely said
cursorily that "it seems clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain
a livelihood, not making an investment." Although this is true, fringe benefits
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investment component-even a substantial investment component-is
sufficient to establish an "investment. 2 37 The key is whether the theo-
retical portion of labor exchanged for incidental equity compensation is
the "primary" motivation of the employment relationship as a whole.
The truly significant "investment" components for most rank-and-file
employees are the security and growth of the cash portion of their com-
pensation, which ordinarily completely overshadows any "investment"
in company equity.
Finally, there are no "public expectations" that would require a
court to regard options as securities under the third factor of Reves. It is
true that, as Forman indicated, the name of a security is not "wholly
irrelevant to the decision whether [an instrument] is a security, 238 and
particularly to the public perception as such. To start thinking about the
typical employee's "expectations," consider, for example, whether the
typical rank-and-file optionee would keep his stock option plan and
grant agreements with his employment papers, such as pay stubs,
employment agreements, and employment related correspondence, or
with investment records, such as stock certificates and brokerage
account statements. The author submits (on a purely anecdotal basis)
that the former would be the classification of most rank-and-file employ-
ees. This consideration, though not a legal or financial analysis, is in
fact the very heart of the third Reves factor-"the reasonable expecta-
tions" of the purported employee "investors."
These "reasonable expectations" that stock options are not securi-
ties are not, moreover, limited to mere laypersons outside the financial
and legal industries. For example, an employee stock option generally
does not constitute a "security" for the purposes of Article 8 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which governs the commercial law rules of
investment securities. 239 Neither are employee stock options widely
regarded as securities from the perspective of the brokerage community.
For example, a leading brokerage firm's question-and-answer section on
employee stock plans states that "[b]ecause stock options are not securi-
ties, they do not appear in your brokerage account. '240 It is an uneasy
obviously are a significant form of compensation, so by use of the word "primarily"
the Court can be said to have found that the employees were, in a not insignificant
part, selling their labor as an investment in their pensions ....
Id.
237. It must be remembered that the Daniel case did not call the pension benefits
"insignificant," but "relatively insignificant"-i.e., relative to the entire compensation package.
See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
238. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850 (1975).
239. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(15) (2001).
240. Charles Schwab & Co., Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.schwab.com/
SchwabNOW/SNLibrary/SNLib 114/SN 114mainFaqs.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
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argument, therefore, that an employee stock option must somehow be
considered a security on the basis of public expectations.
It is certainly true that many equity compensation programs do not
fit the profile described above. This is often the case, for example, with
incentives granted to executive officers of a company who may truly
bargain to "invest" their labor for a negotiated mix of salary and equity.
The same might hold true for some rank-and-file employees in smaller,
more entrepreneurial enterprises where equity compensation is individu-
ally negotiated. But when, as is normally the case, rank-and-file
employees are offered stock options as a relatively insignificant, take-it-
or-leave-it, indivisible part of their overall employment relationship,
those options should not be categorized as securities.
d. Risk-Reducing Factor
The fourth element of the Reves test, the "risk-reducing factor," is
fulfilled in a deceptively simple way in the case of employee stock
options. It is true that unlike the certificates of deposit in Marine Bank
v. Weaver,24' which were subject to banking insurance and regulation,
and unlike the pension plan in Daniel, which was regulated under
ERISA,242 employee stock options are generally not subject to any sub-
stantial non-securities federal regulatory regime. Note, though, that this
analysis ignores the considerable securities regulatory regime that
applies to stock options even if the options themselves are not securities.
Options are unlike ordinary notes, certificates of deposit, or interests in
pension plans in that the value of the option is its right of conversion
into other securities, securities that are subject to the wholesale applica-
tion of the securities laws. As illustrated below,2 43 the securities laws
provide a backstop of redundant regulation that regulates employee
stock options even if such options are classified themselves as non-
securities.
3. NOTES, EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS, AND
''FUNCTIONAL EXCLUSIONS"
The argument for non-security treatment of employee stock
options, as described above, is so compelling precisely because broad-
based employee stock options are so ill-suited for regulation as securi-
ties. The Supreme Court premised its decision in Reves to reject secur-
ity treatment for notes, which are also a specifically enumerated security
category, on the fact that notes "are used in a variety of settings, not all
241. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
242. See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 569-70.
243. See infra Part IV.B.
1242 [Vol. 57:1195
2003] EMPLOYEE INCENTIVES AND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 1243
of which involve investments."' 44 The foundations for that rationale
were laid in the Landreth case when the Court distinguished the term
"notes," "a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with
widely varying characteristics, 245 from the term "stock," "the paradigm
of a security. '246 As illustrated above, employee stock options are also
used in "a variety of settings" "with widely varying characteristics," and,
particularly in the context of broad-based plans, are not always "invest-
ments." In fact, the argument should be even stronger with respect to
the widely varying characteristics of stock options considering that the
Court has previously listed "notes" along with "bonds" and "stocks" as
instruments that are "pretty much standardized and the name alone car-
"1247 thries well settled meaning. Thus, the Supreme Court's rejection of a
literal approach to notes should dispel the objection to scrutinizing stock
options under a Reves context clause approach.
C. The New Gestalt of a "Security"
The transactional approach boasts the considerable advantage of
forging a unified conceptual synthesis of the Forman-Daniel-Reves line
of cases that explains the otherwise anomalous holdings of Marine Bank
and Landreth. The heart of the transactional approach is the second-
level scrutiny of the entire transaction or context that surrounds a pur-
ported security, rather than the first-level inquiry focusing exclusively
on the characteristics of an instrument itself. Forman and Daniel each
ultimately dealt with the fact that the incidental "security" aspects of the
transaction cannot be disaggregated from the overall decision to create a
security. It is indisputable that the instruments involved in Forman,
Daniel, and Reves each had a "security" component as part of the overall
transaction. 248 The second-level, entire transaction inquiry is to be
applied with respect to the "economic reality" of the transaction as a
whole, to ascertain whether the instrument was issued in an "investment
244. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
245. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985).
246. Id. at 693.
247. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). While the Court
classified this statement as "dictum" in United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850
(1975), and again in Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694 (emphasizing that the modem term "note" is "a
relatively broad term"), that classification was intended to refute the notion that "notes" are
somehow as standardized as "stock" because the two instruments were listed together as "pretty
much standardized."
248. This is true despite the fact that the Forman court contended that they bought the stock
"solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living space." Forman, 421 U.S. at 851. Even if that
factual assertion were true, which would be difficult to defend, it would be no different from the
commercial context where a seller took a note "solely to sell the product." There is still a security
component embedded in the sale.
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The decision in Reves, however, not only confirmed the transac-
tional approach, but connected that approach the statutory legitimacy of
the context clause. In Reves, the Court reaffirmed that economic reality
is important not just to investment contracts, but in construing the scope
of the securities laws generally.2 10 Thus, after Reves, the "entire transac-
tion" and "economic reality" approaches may be classified as criteria for
determining whether "the context otherwise requires."'251 The reaffirma-
tion of these principles allows us to say confidently, as even many liter-
alists have conceded, that the phrase "the context otherwise requires"
"refers to the transactional context in which an instrument appears
rather than solely the textual context in which a defined term is used in
the securities laws. 252 The Reves Court, without even explicitly
acknowledging the context clause, adopted a second-stage analytical
approach that grew from that clause.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Forman conceived the embryonic
form of the functional, transaction-based approach to defining a secur-
ity.253 Only by looking to the underlying housing transaction could it
reach its holding-at least on the investment contract issue analysis.
Significantly, the Forman Court's observation that "when the underlying
transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typically
associated with the named instrument, ''1 5  reveals that even correspon-
249. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1990).
250. See id. at 61. The seemingly innocuous notion that "economic reality" should govern the
inclusion of an instrument within the scope of the securities laws was nonetheless thrown into
doubt in the Landreth case. In Reves, however, the Court made it clear that Landreth should not
be read as signifying "a lack of concern with economic reality," but simply that stock was a
special case where the economic reality test was unnecessary. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 62.
251. Even the court of appeals decision in the Daniel case acknowledged the relationship
between "economic reality" and the "context clause," explaining that the "context" referred to in
that clause "is, of course, economic reality in view of the surrounding factual circumstances."
Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1236 (7th Cir. 1979).
252. Gary S. Rosin, Historical Perspectives on the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L. REv.
575, 587-88 (1987) [hereinafter Rosin, Historical Perspectives].
253. The test in Forman might rightly be regarded as embodying both literalist and anti-
literalist aspects. Forman's discussion of "stock" focused heavily on the characteristics of the
instrument itself. But Forman's investment contract discussion was highly transaction based.
Even some literalist commentators agree that Forman was a functional or transaction-based test.
See, e.g., Rosin, Functional Exclusions, supra note 166, at 335 ("The use of functional exclusions
was spurred in 1975 by the Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.").
254. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975). In Landreth, Justice
Powell himself appears to have misquoted his own statement in Forman, stating that "we
concluded that we must also determine whether those instruments possess 'some of the significant
characteristics typically associated with' stock." Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
686 (1985). Yet, there are really two parts to the test in Forman that are related. The first is
whether the instrument itself bears the characteristics usually associated with its name, and the
second is the likelihood that the purchasers were "misled . . . into believing that the federal
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dence to the enumerated instruments themselves is to be ascertained by
reference to the "entire transaction" or "underlying transaction," not
merely to the terms of an instrument. The transactional analysis articu-
lated in Forman blossomed into its mature form in Daniel, when the
Court more directly explained that in order to determine whether a per-
son "invested," "it is necessary to look at the entire transaction through
which he obtained a chance to receive" the purported security.255
The 1982 case, Marine Bank, not only reaffirmed the "entire trans-
action" approach, but also further secured that approach to the statutory
anchor of the context clause. In determining that a certificate of deposit
and a business agreement were not securities, the Court applied the con-
text clause by examining the factual setting of the entire transactions at
issue. The Court explained its holding by emphasizing the importance
of the transactional analysis, that in determining whether a particular
business transaction falls outside the definition of a security, "[e]ach
transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis of the content of
the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served, and the
factual setting as a whole. '2 56 This case, as literalist commentators have
lamented, "appears to have assumed that the 'context' clause authorizes
judicial exclusions on the basis of factual circumstances, even if an
instrument otherwise falls within the statutory definition of a 'secur-
ity."2 57 That is, even if the instruments at issue had fallen within an
enumerated category of security, the context would have "otherwise
require[d]." Thus, the Court's analysis suggests a two-stage approach to
defining a security. A first stage ascertains whether an instrument falls
within the first level of security instruments, such as stocks, bonds, or
investment contracts, and a second stage examines the "circumstances or
context" justifying the application of the Acts." '58
The contextual second-stage analysis allows a reading of the ana-
lytically outlying Marine Bank case consistently with the body of
Supreme Court definition-of-security jurisprudence. The Marine Bank
case drew considerable criticism for holding that the transactions there at
issue were not securities without even considering the Howey invest-
ment contract test.2 9 The very same commentators who realized that
securities laws governed their purchase." Forman, 421 U.S. at 851. Obviously the first factor
feeds into the second. This distinction might seem excessively fine, but it was reproduced twice
in two-part form in Landreth, once to describe the Forman case and once to analyze the stock at
issue in Landreth. See Landreth, 471 U.S. at 687.
255. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979).
256. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.l 1 (1982) (emphasis added).
257. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 17, at 504.
258. See Chang, supra note 147, at 429-30.
259. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 17, at 503. One commentator called the Marine Bank
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Marine Bank was a context clause case2 6° took the curious position that
"the only reasonable conclusion" was that the Marine Bank decision
constituted a "modification or supplement to the Howey test."'26' That
position led those commentators to conclude that "Weaver signifies that
an investment contract may not exist even if the Howey test is
satisfied. 262
The better interpretation of Marine Bank, however, is that the deci-
sion did not, and did not purport to, decide whether the transactions at
issue were "investment contracts;" rather, it decided whether those trans-
actions, even if investment contracts, were nonetheless not securities.
The clear and explicit context clause analysis of the Marine Bank opin-
ion clearly reveals that the case did not replace Howey or add further
requirements to the Howey test; instead the Court found it unnecessary
to apply the Howey text because the "context otherwise required." As
demonstrated in the earlier Reves discussion, the context clause is better
regarded not as affecting the first-level inquiry of whether a "stock,"
"note," or "investment contract" exists, but whether the context removes
a "stock," "note," or "investment contract" from security status.2 63
Thus, Marine Bank's failure to grapple with the Howey test was not the
reinterpretation of the meaning of an investment contract, but the recog-
nition that, as Professor Chang put it, "[u]nder the two-tier test, a court
need not rule on the first level if second level considerations would
exclude the instrument. 264 Conversely, even if the first level criteria
are satisfied, and even in the case of an "investment contract," the sec-
ond-level criteria may still make the instrument a non-security.265
decision the Supreme Court's "worst definitional opinion." See McGinty, supra note 128, at
1052.
260. Steinburg & Kaulbach, supra note 17, at 504-12.
261. id. at 523.
262. Id. at 525.
263. As Professor Chang explained, there are "two versions" of the Court's decision in Marine
Bank:
First Version: The Supreme Court held that the agreement was not an investment
contract and thus failed to fall within a class of level one instruments .... Second
Version: The Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether the agreement was
an investment contract. It held that even if the instrument were an investment
contract ... it would be excluded at the second level because it was not within the
concept of a security.
Chang, supra note 147, at 446. If the Court adopted the first version, that would likely signal the
Court's adoption of the so-called "horizontal commonality" requirement for investment contracts.
See id. at 446. If the Court adopted the second version, however, it need not make any implication
about the broader "horizontal commonality" requirement. See id. The second version is the better
reading of Marine Bank. Id. at 447.
264. Id. at 444.
265. This fact was noted by a court of appeals case decided contemporaneously with Reves.
See Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 579 (10th Cir. 1991).
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This contextual approach is even supported in Landreth, where the
Court found the context did not "otherwise require." In Landreth, the
Court stressed the importance of "context" throughout the opinion,
266
and justified its literalist treatment of stock in a way that actually sup-
ports the necessity of a contextual finding of an "investment." The
Court implicitly treated the context inquiry seriously enough that it felt
the need to observe that the sale of stock was "the kind of context to
which the Acts normally apply. '267 Reves confirmed this contextual
inquiry, explaining that the reason the Landreth stock was necessarily a
security was that "[s]ome instruments are obviously within the class
Congress intended to regulate because they are by their nature invest-
ments.' 268 The contextual discussion in Landreth, therefore, supports
the proposition that traditional stock is always a security not merely
because it is "stock," but because it has an "investment" context. After
Landreth, even the literalist commentators seem to have grudgingly
accepted the fact that the Court's context clause analysis takes into
account the entire factual context of the transaction. 69
The construction of the Forman-Daniel-Reves synthesis helps to
reconcile the literal approach of Landreth with the contextual approach
of Forman-Daniel-Reves. Landreth made it clear that stock is "likely to
be covered by the definition" of a security, without a case-by-case eco-
nomic analysis, provided it "possess[es] 'some of the significant charac-
teristics typically associated with' stock. '27" But Reves revealed that the
reason no "case-by-case analysis" is appropriate with stock is that stock
is a "special case, explicitly limiting [the Landreth Court's] holding to
that sort of instrument. 271 In fact, according to Reves, stock is "the
quintessence of a security ... and investors therefore justifiably assume
that a sale of stock is covered by the Securities Acts. 272 Thus, notes are
not subject to a "special case" contextual analysis as an exception to a
generally applicable literal approach. Rather, stock is subject to a "spe-
266. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687, 690, 694 (1985).
267. Id. at 687.
268. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990) (emphasis added).
269. See Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 17, at 506 ("The language in Weaver, particularly
when considered with the subsequent decision in Landreth, indicates that the Court apparently
adheres now to the view that the 'context' clause refers (at least in part) to the underlying
transaction's factual context.").
270. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686.
271. Reves, 494 U.S. at 62.
272. Id. The Reves emphasis on "public perception" and "reasonable expectations" would
suggest that stock whose characteristics accord with its name is automatically a security because
stock always satisfies the third factor of the Reves test-the "reasonable expectations of the
investing public." In fact, Landreth was cited by the Court as authority for the third factor of the
test. See id. at 66-67.
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cial case" literal analysis as an exception to a generally applicable con-
textual approach.
The Court's framework for determining whether an instrument is a
security, therefore, proceeds as follows. If an instrument is nominally
listed in the statutory formulation, the Court will examine the character-
istics of the instrument d la Forman to determine whether it bears "some
of the significant characteristics" of instruments of that type.27 3 If the
instrument is not listed in the statutory formulation, or if the instrument
is listed in the statutory formulation but its characteristics do not match
its label, then the instrument will need to qualify under the "catchall"
categories and the court will apply Howey. When an instrument is an
enumerated instrument and its characteristics match that label, the court
will examine the economic reality of the underlying transaction accord-
ing to the Reves test to determine whether the "context otherwise
requires,' 274 applying a presumption that the enumerated instrument is a
security.275 If the instrument is "stock," and it bears some of the charac-
teristics usually associated with traditional stock, then "a purchaser justi-
fiably [may] assume that the federal securities laws apply, ' 2 6 and the
third factor of Reves will ensure that the instrument is a security. If the
instrument is not "traditional stock," then the treatment of the underlying
transaction depends on the application of the Reves factors.
D. Limits to Non-Security Treatment
This article explains why certain types of employee equity incen-
tives, including some broad-based employee stock options, should not
be regarded as securities under the Forman-Daniel-Reves line of cases.
Throughout this article, however, in the context of both employee stock
options and other equity incentive devices, I have emphasized that the
"no investment" theory would not apply to "voluntary," "contributory"
employee incentives, as would arise in employment arrangements sub-
ject to individual bargaining. This qualification merely acknowledges
that just as the Commission's simplistic taxonomic approach should not
be used to necessarily include employee stock options as securities,
neither should that same approach be used to necessarily exclude
employee stock options as securities. The thesis, therefore, of this arti-
273. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975).
274. Like notes, many other instruments on the enumerated list, other than stock, "are used in a
variety of settings, not all of which involve investments." Reves, 494 U.S. at 62.
275. See id. at 65. The name of the instrument is not determinative of its inclusion as a
security, but it is relevant. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 850; see also Reves, 494 U.S. at 65.
276. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at
850).
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cle is not that employee stock options are necessarily not securities, but
that employee stock options are not necessarily securities.
The criteria for distinguishing between investment and non-invest-
ment employee incentives were set forth in the Daniel decision itself
and, as described above, are identical under a "no sale" or "no invest-
ment" theory. The test for an investment (or a sale) is a voluntary con-
tribution of a "specific consideration" in return for "a separable financial
interest with the characteristics of a security." Under either a no-sale or
a no-investment theory, the crucial question is whether the employee
had the opportunity to contribute an individually bargained-for specific
consideration, such as labor, cash, or other securities, or to forego an
accrued compensatory interest, in return for a security. This approach is
consistent with the no-sale analysis applied by the Commission with
respect to stock "bonus" plans-that such plans ordinarily need not be
registered because there would be no "sale"ZT-but that the no-sale
treatment would not extend to a situation where the employee acquired
securities pursuant to individual bargaining. 78
The reason that individually bargained for agreements would
involve an investment and therefore potentially a security is that such
agreements would normally be "voluntary" and "contributory" in the
language of Daniel. The notion of a "voluntary" and "contributory"
arrangement, as noted earlier, is equivalent to the concept of a "sale,"
and the lower federal courts have been very generous in finding "sales"
in appropriate circumstances. For example, in a pre-Daniel case, Collins
v. Rukin,279 the district court found a sale where a plaintiff accepted
employment as an electrical engineer and an executive officer with a
stock option as quid pro quo.28° In a similar case, Yoder v.
Orthomolecular Nutrition Institute,"' Judge Friendly explained that
there was "no reason" why a person who "commits herself to employ-
ment by a corporation in return for stock or the promise of stock should
277. In Release 6188, the Commission explained that although stock awarded to employees
under stock bonus plans
is a security, the staff generally has not required it to be registered. The basis for
this position generally has been that there is no "sale" in the 1933 Act sense to
employees, since such persons do not individually bargain to contribute cash or
other tangible or definable consideration to such plans.
Release 6188, supra note 64, at 2073-15.
278. Specifically, the staff noted that its position generally is applicable only in the context of
bonus plans which are made available to a relatively broad class of employees. With respect to
stock awarded to, or acquired by, employees pursuant to individual employment arrangements, the
staff generally has concluded that such arrangements involve separately bargained consideration,
and that a sale of the stock has occurred. Id. at 2073-15 n.84.
279. 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972).
280. Id. at 1289-90.
281. 751 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1985).
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not be considered an investor. '28 2 The same result would obtain if the
instrument were an automatic incident of the employment relationship if
that incident were the predominant motivating factor in the employment
relationship.2 83 An excellent example is Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group,
284
where a district court found an "investment" and a "sale" where an exec-
utive entered into an employment relationship based on the prospects of
acquiring stock and stock options under an incentive plan.285
While these lower court cases illustrate the limits to "no invest-
ment" and "no sale" treatment under the securities laws in the context of
employment relationships, they do not undermine or contradict the anal-
ysis presented in this article. In each of these lower court cases, the
plaintiff "changed his way of life and his job-in return for the stock
and stock options available through the Plan"286 or "part[ed] with his or
her established way of life in return for a contract to issue stock.
28 7
Those circumstances differ dramatically from the "investment" decision
of the typical rank-and-file employee receiving incidental option grants
pursuant to an employment relationship he or she accepted "primarily to
obtain a livelihood." These cases, involving executive or
entrepreneurial employees and specifically negotiated compensation
agreements, are more easily characterized as involving "investments."
When an employee relies on promises of securities in accepting an
employment opportunity, it is fully appropriate for courts to reach the
result in Yoder-that the context does not "otherwise require. '"288
282. Id. at 560.
283. In effect, when the predominant decisional criterion is the "investment" in the instrument
itself, rather than in the employment relationship, there is a voluntary, contributory investment
decision. This would be equally true (although unlikely as a practical matter) in the pension plan
context, as one insightful federal court judge in Guam pointed out. See Sec. Adm'r v. Coll.
Assistance Plan, 533 F. Supp. 118, 121 n.8 (D. Guam 1981) ("Daniel does not foreclose that the
federal test may find an investment contract where the record demonstrates that the pension's
investment potential was a primary motivation for a worker's choice of employment.").
284. 695 F. Supp. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
285. In Dubin, the court found a "sale" and an "investment" under Daniel solely on the basis
that "interests in the Plan had to be recommended by management and approved ...by the
Compensation Committee of the Board" and therefore "an executive would expect to make some
contribution to the company in return for the stock or stock options offered by the Plan." Id. at
145.
286. Id.
287. Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1985).
288. See, e.g., id. at 559-61. The Yoder case is particularly instructive in that it examined
whether the "context" clause would prevent a person from being "an investor" in the context of an
employment relationship. The court noted that "[w]e see no reason why 'the context requires' us
to hold that an individual who commits herself to employment by a corporation in return for stock
or the promise of stock should not be considered an investor." Id. at 560. This case, unlike the
broad-based employee incentive plan, dealt with an individually negotiated agreement pursuant to
which the employee "part[ed] with his or her established way of life in return for a contract to
issue stock." Id. In this case, the court found it unnecessary to hold whether the context otherwise
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The more difficult problem-one not reached in the Daniel case-
is where an existing employee has the election to receive either addi-
tional equity compensation or additional cash compensation, and may
elect between the two. The immediate response, based on the Daniel
analysis presented above, would be that the employee is being presented
with an investment decision regarding "specific consideration"-i.e.,
alienating the cash compensation in exchange for the equity compensa-
tion. Yet, there is an analogous no-sale analysis in the context of divi-
dends that would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. Well-settled
administrative practice provides a firm's declaration and distribution of
a stock dividend of its own stock does not involve a "sale" of a secur-
ity. 89 The Commission, however, has for many years taken this "no-
sale" analysis one step further. In one of the oldest Commission letters
still applicable today, the Commission's General Counsel took the posi-
tion that a dividend declared as an election between cash and stock
would not constitute a "sale" unless the election were with respect to a
cash dividend already declared-i.e., the stockholders waived "preexist-
ing and vested rights to payment of the dividend in cash" in exchange
for stock or other securities.2 9 ° The "no-sale" conclusion applies today
not only in the context of elections of dividends among cash and stock,
but also in the context of elections among various classes of stock.29'
The plain vanilla stock dividend situation is obviously analogous to
the distribution of true employee "bonus stock," or stock with no quid
pro quo. The dividend election context, similarly, is analogous to the
situation where a company offers a bonus, again with no quid pro quo
on the part of the employee, that is payable at the election of the
employee either in stock or in cash. In that scenario, provided that the
bonus right had not already accrued, and provided that the dividend
analogy holds, no sale would occur. If, on the other hand, employees
were given the option on a prospective basis to forego payment of future
accrued salary in exchange for securities, then a slightly different anal-
ogy to dividends may provide the answer. The Commission takes the
position that a dividend reinvestment program, in which stockholders
may by prior agreement have dividends applied to purchase additional
required since the plaintiff parted not only with her "way of life" but also the assets of her
business. See id. at 560-61.
289. See H.R. REP. No. 73-152, at 25 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
21, at 25 (explaining there was no need to exempt stock dividends from the Securities Act because
"they do not constitute a sale, not being given for value").
290. Dividend Payments, Exchange Act Release No. 33-929, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1121,
at 2099 (July 29, 1936).
291. See, e.g., JDN Realty Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 77,643, at
76,277 (Oct. 26, 1999).
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shares of the issuer, can constitute sales.2 92 Thus, to the extent this
"sale" guidance is controlling, an individual election to accept a bonus in
cash or equity would not involve a "sale" (or an "investment"), but
entering into a program by which future salary was systematically
deferred could constitute a sale (and an "investment").
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The characterization of certain broad-based equity incentives as
non-securities is supported by sound policy considerations. As
employee equity incentives have become generalized over the past three
decades, employers and the Commission alike have struggled to recon-
cile a securities law regime designed to regulate capital-raising transac-
tions with equity incentives designed to promote employee productivity,
loyalty, and morale. The securities laws are oriented toward improving
investment decisions, not toward evaluating employment opportunities
or moving employment disputes into federal courts. And while these
policy considerations, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted,2 93 are
proper factors to consider when interpreting this area of the law, there is
another, overriding legal consideration that should palliate any concern
associated with treating employee incentives as non-securities. As illus-
trated in this Part, the redundant regulation of rights, warrants, and
options under the Securities Acts ensures that, where valid securities
claims exist, complaints with respect to employee stock options will
continue to state federal causes of action under the securities laws.
A. Issuer Burdens and Commission Confusion
The unfortunate reality is that the Commission's exemptive "relief'
is not only not relief, but is not even sensitive to the mechanisms of the
Commission's own regulations. First, the Commission's exemptive
"relief," in some respects, imposes burdens beyond those associated with
Exchange Act registration. For example, issuers registered pursuant to
Section 12(g) are obligated to file their annual and quarterly reports with
the Commission, 94 but have no obligation to "provide" security holders
with quarterly reports and normally "provide" security holders with
annual reports only upon proxy solicitation in connection with the elec-
tion of directors. 295 Because holders of employee stock options almost
292. See Interpretation of the Division of Corporation Finance Relationg to Dividend
Reinvestment and Similar Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 33-5515, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
79,907, at 84,323 (Aug. 8, 1974).
293. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975); see also
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694-95 n.7 (1985).
294. See 17 C.F.R § 240.13a-1 (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2003).
295. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (2003).
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never have the right to vote for directors, registration of those options
would not generally trigger an obligation to distribute those reports.
Second, the Commission's conditions are so poorly adapted to the
Commission's own disclosure system that an argument could be made
that those conditions impose no duties at all. Specifically, the Commis-
sion's exemptive relief is conditioned on the issuer providing option
holders with the same information they would have received had the
company registered the class of securities under Section 12.296 But as
illustrated in the preceding paragraph, the stock option holders would
not "receive" most types of information even if the options were regis-
tered under Section 12. The Commission simply assumed that there is
an obligation imposed by Section 12(g) registration to distribute annual
reports to shareholders, which is not, in fact, the case. 97 It is, of course,
not hard to guess what the Commission meant to say, but the Commis-
sion's failure to seriously analyze the legal issues imparts a whimsical
quality to the whole affair.
In order to dislodge the Commission from its regulatory stance or,
in the alternative, to persuade the courts to overturn the Commission's
regulatory position, it will be necessary to discredit the inevitable
"parade of horribles" that will result from any suggestion of contracting
the scope of the securities laws. The prospect of deregulating any estab-
lished aspect of the securities laws is approached by the securities law
community and the courts with a sense of trepidation about leaving true
securities transactions unregulated. In fact, as discussed above, the pres-
ence of an alternative regulatory scheme or other "risk-reducing factor"
was specifically incorporated in the Reves four-factor test for whether
application of the securities laws is unnecessary. The discussion below
attempts to outline the effects of the non-security approach on the princi-
pal regulatory linchpins of the federal securities laws.
B. Coverage of the Securities Acts
An overview tour of the Securities Acts reveals that the non-secur-
ity approach to broad-based employee stock options would have little, if
any, significant effect on the policy objectives of the those Acts. This is
principally because stock options and other rights to acquire securities
are subject to significant securities regulation even if they are not them-
selves securities. Employee stock options are both offers to sell securi-
296. See CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 10.
297. One reason for this might be the fact that Section 12(g) issuers almost universally
distribute these documents to shareholders. First, most issuers distribute annual proxy statements
and therefore incur an obligation to provide recipients of proxy statements with annual reports
under Rule 14a-3(b). Second, even if a company was not making a solicitation, self-regulatory
organizations such as NASD rule 4350(b) would require distribution of an annual report.
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ties and contracts to buy or sell securities; these characteristics
themselves subject options to considerable securities law regulation.
Even in those cases where non-security treatment would exclude options
from regulation under the Securities Acts, there is a high likelihood the
relevant provision would not apply to stock options anyway. Employee
stock options are so closely tied to employment relationships and so
lacking in the ordinary hallmarks of traditional securities that many pro-
visions of the Securities Acts are, by their own terms, inapplicable
whether or not those options are securities.
1. SECURITIES ACT CONSIDERATIONS
The Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that a company
offers its securities solely to its so-called "key" employees does not nec-
essarily make the offering a "private" offering exempt from registra-
tion.298 Accordingly, offers and sales of securities to broad groups of
employees, "key" or not, require registration under the Securities Act or
an exemption from registration. The Commission, however, has recog-
nized that registration of employee stock options is not normally
required in connection with the grant of those options. 299 This treatment
results from the fact that in making an option grant, the issuer normally
has not made a disposition of the options "for value" and therefore has
not made an "offer" or "sale" of the options within the meaning of the
Securities Act. 3" Accordingly, it would be unusual for an issuer to reg-
ister employee stock options themselves under the Securities Act (as
298. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
299. See, e.g., Analysis & Tech., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 27, 1981), 1981 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 2789; Formation, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 5, 1977), 1977 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2801; Computer Transmission Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (May 6, 1976), 1976 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1044; Dayton Steel Foundry Co., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 18,
1971), 1971 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2392; see also Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities
Act Release No. 33-6455, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2380, at 2637-16 (Mar. 3, 1983), available
at http:www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/regd.htm#release (stating in response to Question 78
that "[i]n a typical plan, the grant of options will not be deemed a sale of a security for purposes of
the Securities Act").
300. See supra note 299. At least one district court, however, has stated that a "sale" occurs
upon the grant of a stock option within the meaning of the Exchange Act. See Safecard Servs. v.
Dow Jones & Co., 537 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1982). But there are several reasons
that this court's position is inapplicable to the present issue. First, as noted above, the Exchange
Act, unlike the Securities Act, contains no express "value" requirement, so it is possible that the
Exchange Act contains a looser definition of "sale." Second, for the general proposition that the
grant of an option constitutes a "sale," the court relied on Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236
(7th Cir. 1977), which held only that a corporation issuing warrants for cash would be a "seller" of
those warrants, an uncontroversial point. See id. at 246-47. Finally, although the Court in
Safecard did not specify whether the grant of an option was the "sale" of the option or the stock
underlying the option, the case upon which it relied, Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass.
1972), appears to hold only that the sale of the underlying stock occurred. See id. at 1288-89.
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opposed to registering the stock underlying the stock options, which is
common).
The principal Securities Act regulation of options, therefore, occurs
in connection with their exercise, not their grant. An exercise for cash
involves a sale within the meaning of the Securities Act because the
optionee surrenders specific consideration (cash) for the shares of stock
underlying the option. Further, each outstanding option embodies a con-
tinuing "offer" to sell the underlying stock on exercise, which, in the
Commission's view, "generally will commence when the options
become exercisable and will continue until the options are exercised or
otherwise terminated.""'' In this regard the Commission has accorded
issuers some relief, providing that "the underlying shares may be regis-
tered at any time before the option is exercised."30 2 Therefore, to com-
ply with the registration provisions of the Securities Acts, public
companies generally register the stock underlying employee options on
Form S-8, and private companies generally rely on the exemption from
registration provided by Rule 701113 for the underlying stock.
None of these results would be changed by classifying employee
stock options as non-securities. As under present law, the grant of the
options would be exempt from registration under the Securities Act and
the offer embodied in the option would constitute an offer from and after
the date the option becomes exercisable. 3°  As under present law, the
sale of the underlying stock upon exercise would not be exempt under
Section 3(a)(9) and would require registration or an exemption there-
from. 3 5 The exercise of an employee stock option would still involve
an investment decision and the classification of options as non-securities
does not change anything from that perspective. To the extent the ongo-
ing offer of common stock intrinsic in the option did not fall within a
private offering or other exemption, that offer would still be subject to
Securities Act registration. To the extent that ongoing offer was exempt
301. See Interpretive Release on Regulation D, supra note 299. The options do not constitute
an offer of the underlying security until they are exercisable by virtue of Section 2(a)(3) of the
Securities Act, which excludes from the definition of "offer," "[t]he issue or transfer of a right or
privilege, when originally issued or transferred with a security, giving the holder of such security
the right to convert such security into another security of the same issuer.., which right cannot be
exercised until some future date." Id.
302. See Div. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, MANUAL OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE TELEPHONE
INTERPRETATIONS, No. 61 (July 1997) [hereinafter TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS].
303. 17 C.F.R § 230.701 (2003).
304. The Commission staff takes the position that, with respect to Form S-8, shares underlying
employee stock options may be registered at any time before an option is exercised, without
regard to when the option became exercisable. See TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 302.
305. The 3(a)(9) exemption is normally unavailable to option exercises because the exercise
involves a payment of the exercise price in cash to the issuer and therefore is not the "exchange"
of a "security."
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from registration, the decision has already been made to exempt that
offer from the Securities Act.
Further, treating employee stock options as non-securities could
actually increase the protections under the Securities Act for the increas-
ingly common option exchange offer. Under present law, those offers
and sales are normally exempt from registration pursuant to Section
3(a)(9) of the Securities Act, which exempts "any security exchanged by
the issuer with its existing security holders exclusively where no com-
mission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for
soliciting such exchange. 3 °6 While such offers are currently subject to
the tender offer rules, registration of the securities offered is not
required. If employee stock options were treated as non-securities, such
exchange offers would likely be required to be registered as the Section
3(a)(9) exemption would no longer apply.
2. EXCHANGE ACT CONSIDERATIONS
More importantly, classification of employee stock options as non-
securities would have a minimal effect on the "investor" protection pro-
visions of the Exchange Act. Most of the provisions of the Exchange
Act are simply inapplicable to employee stock options, whether such
options are securities or not. Employee stock options cannot be voted,
so they do not need the protection of the proxy rules.30 7 They cannot be
purchased or sold, so they are not covered by the provisions of the anti-
fraud rules. 308 They are not traded on exchanges, over the counter, or on
national market systems, so the secondary trading regulatory provisions
are inapplicable. In fact, other than the registration and reporting
requirements of the Exchange Act, which Congress intended to apply
only to publicly traded securities,30 9 the classification of employee stock
options as non-securities in most cases would not reduce any significant
investor protections.
The most visible provisions of the Exchange Act specifically and
probably "the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws"
generally310 are the antifraud provisions centered around Section 10(b)
306. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1996).
307. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-I to 240.14a-104 (2003).
308. Note, however, that the courts and the Commission have, under certain circumstances,
regarded an employee's voluntary departure resulting in an extinguishment of incentive securities
or in their sale back to the employer as an "investment decision" and therefore potentially a "sale."
See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1987).
309. See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
310. SEC v. Nat'l Sec., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1968); see also Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading
Deterrence versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV.
2088, 2091 n.8 (1994) (noting that Rule lOb-5 generated the most reported cases of the federal
securities laws for the period 1987 through 1992).
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of the Exchange Act and Commission Rule lOb-5.31 ' These provisions
make unlawful manipulative or deceptive practices in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities. As the language of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 indicate and as the Supreme Court has held,3 12 these
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act require a "purchase or sale of
[a] security." In the context of stock options issued in a compensatory
or incentive context, the question is whether the grant of such options
without "value" would constitute a "sale" for the purpose of these very
important antifraud provisions.
At one time, the view was common that the grant of an option did,
in fact, constitute a "sale" of the option itself for the purposes of the
Exchange Act, and therefore Rule lOb-5 applied.31 3 Daniel made that
interpretation uncertain, as that case suggested that in fact the Exchange
Act concept of a "sale" may incorporate a "value" requirement also.
Thus, the present position that option grants normally do not constitute
the "value" necessary for a "sale" under the Securities Act brings the
"value" requirement into controversy for the purposes of the Exchange
Act in general, and Rule lOb-5 in particular. It has not been definitively
decided whether the Exchange Act definition of a "sale" contains a
"value" requirement.31 4 The fact that the purported "sale" is bound up
with a retirement decision does not preclude the applicability of Section
10(b), and therefore does not undermine a "sale" finding.31 5 Other
courts have cast similar situations under Section 10(b) in terms of
311. Section 10(b) provides, in pertinent part, that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (1) to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
312. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
313. See Arnold S. Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in the Regulation
of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 80 (1973) ("[Issuance by a corporation of a
stock option is a 'sale' to which lob-5 applies.").
314. But see Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968) (arguing that there is "no
reason to believe that Congress intended, one year after the passage of the Securities Act, to dilute
the concept of a sale in the Securities Exchange Act").
315. See, e.g., Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1159-61 (D.D.C.
1986).
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whether information is "material. 316
Whether or not the Exchange Act concept of a sale contains a value
requirement, the option holder may still be a purchaser of a security. If
the Exchange Act does not contain a value requirement, then there
would be a sale of the option under the Exchange Act regardless of
whether there is value under the Securities Act. If the Exchange Act
does contain a value requirement, then for anti-fraud purposes a sale of
the underlying stock could still occur on the grant of the option because
the option would constitute a "contract" to sell the underlying stock for
value (the price paid to be paid on exercise). Blue Chip Stamps made it
clear that "holders of puts, calls, options, and other contractual rights or
duties to purchase or sell securities have been recognized as 'purchasers'
or 'sellers' of securities," '317 and any value requirement would be satis-
fied by the exercise price to be paid for the underlying stock. Thus, for
purposes of the Exchange Act in general and the antifraud provisions in
particular, employee stock options would continue to be subject to the
antifraud and insider trading provisions as "sales" of the underlying
stock.
The implications of non-security treatment are less clear with
respect to other employee incentives such as SARs. SARs, unlike
employee stock options, do not necessarily constitute contracts to
acquire securities, and therefore the exercise of such instruments may
not constitute the "purchase or sale" of a security within the meaning of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.31 8 The fear, of course, is that insiders
will manipulate stock appreciation rights and other incentives "as a form
of shadow stock to achieve the same financial gains obtainable through
legally impermissible transactions in actual securities. '319 Accordingly,
the Commission has engaged in a regulatory sleight of hand to keep
SARs from escaping Section 16 of the Exchange Act without explicitly
316. See, e.g., Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1976)
(noting that the "voluntary decision to retire was also a voluntary decision to sell" where employer
had an option to repurchase employee's stock and had indicated intent to do so on employee's
retirement); Ryan v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding undisclosed
information was not material in a similar situation).
317. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 751. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this
position. See Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, 532 U.S. 588 (2001) (citing Blue
Chip Stamps).
318. There exists some doubt, even apart from the approach articulated in this article, as to
whether a SAR constitutes a "security." The exercise of a SAR for cash is the economic
equivalent of an exercise of a stock option and the immediate sale of the shares subject to the
option. See Fox, supra note 310, at 2188. The question, however, is analytically identical to that
of cash-settled options, which were found to be securities in the recent case of Caiola v. Citibank,
295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002).
319. Stuart R. Cohn, Stock Appreciation Rights and the SEC: A Case of Questionable
Rulemaking, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 68 (1978).
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taking a position on their security or non-security character. 320 But with
respect to the garden variety of insider trading addressed by Rule lOb-5,
institutional controls and the restrictions of fiduciary duties make the
specter of abuse mere "conjecture."32' Unlike common stock, SARs
cannot be acquired in the open market; the acquisition and exercise of
SARs occur at times determined by the board of directors or compensa-
tion committee of the employer.
Further, the approach proposed in this article would have almost no
effect on Sections 13 and 14 of the Exchange Act on non-reporting issu-
ers, and only a minimal effect on reporting issuers. It is true that the
proxy rules of Section 14(a) and (c) would no longer apply to non-secur-
ity employee stock options, and therefore solicitations of consents from
holders of employee stock options would not be subject to the proxy
rules. Nonetheless, these provisions would not ordinarily apply to
employee stock options even if those options were registered under Sec-
tion 12(g). This is because the provisions of Section 14(a) and (c) are
only triggered by a vote or consent of security holders, and employee
stock options are not generally entitled to vote or consent on corporate
matters anyway.
Neither would this approach have any significant effect in general
on the Williams Act treatment of issuers.3 2 It is true that the classifica-
tion of employee stock options as non-securities would arguably elimi-
nate the applicability of the tender offer provisions of Sections 14(d) and
14(e) and the self-tender rules of Section 13(e),3 23 meaning that cash
tender offers for non-security employee stock options would no longer
be subject to the tender offer rules.32 4 On the other hand, unlike current
320. The Commission treats the acquisition, exercise, and expiration of stock options and
SARs as transactions in the so-called "underlying security" for the purposes of Section 16, not in
the options or SARs themselves. The Commission's rules under Section 16 define a "derivative
security" as "any option, warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation right, or similar right
• ..or similar securities with a value derived from the value of an equity security." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.16a-3(c) (2003). Although such "derivative securities" have some independent significance
with respect to the reporting provisions of Section 16, see 17 C.F.R. § 16a-4 (2003), the operative
disgorgement provisions of Section 16 simply treat "derivative security" transactions as
transactions in the "underlying securities." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (2003).
321. Cohn, supra note 319 at 83-85.
322. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (2000).
323. There is an argument, however, that the employee stock options would constitute
securities for the purposes of the tender offer provisions. At least one court has held that the
subsequent sale of a non-security under Reves could transform the non-security into a security by
vitiating the Reves "plan of distribution" factor. See Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, 736
F. Supp. 64 (W.D. Mich. 1990). Accordingly, it is conceivable that a plaintiff could argue that the
option was transformed into a security by the tender offer. This argument is weak, however, for
numerous reasons, not the least of which is the fact that the issuer's repurchase of the instrument,
if anything, diminishes the "distribution" of the instrument.
324. I say "arguably," because it is possible that making a tender offer inviting the offeree to
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practice, exchange offers for the employee stock options 325 would
become subject to Securities Act registration, absent an applicable
exemption. 326 Thus, in a sense, classifying employee stock options as
non-securities would simply shift the regulatory emphasis from the awk-
ward Exchange Act to the more conceptually appropriate Securities Act.
The beneficial ownership reporting provisions of the securities laws,
contained in Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act would also be unaf-
fected by this article's position. 7 Although the provisions of Section
13(d) would not be applicable to the options themselves, the same pur-
pose would be served because the stock options would still constitute the
"right to acquire" the underlying stock even if not themselves
"securities."328
The final major area of significance in the Exchange Act is "short-
swing" trading requirement of Section 16329 thereof, which imposes lia-
bility on "officers," "directors," and certain large shareholders for profits
made from purchases sales or sales and purchases of "equity securities"
of a reporting company within a six-month period.330 The position
advocated in this article, however, would have little effect on Section 16
surrender vested rights (whether or not securities prior to the offer) would transform those non-
security rights into securities purchased by the offeror. The protections of the tender offer rules
may therefore apply to such rights.
325. Such "exchange offers" frequently occur in connection with option repricing, for
example. Typical employee stock option agreements require the consent of the option holder to
modify the option agreement in a manner adverse to such holder. The Commission takes the
position that offers to modify such options will constitute an exchange offer if the modification is
"fundamental." TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 302. Under the current treatment of
employee stock options, such exchange offers are exempt from registration under Section 3(a)(9)
of the Securities Act.
326. Rule 701 under the Securities Act would ordinarily apply to such exchange offers by non-
reporting issuers, provided the offer met the maximum offering amount limits and the other
provisions of that rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2003).
327. The provisions of Section 13(d) require reporting to the Commission, subject to certain
exceptions, of the acquisition of "beneficial ownership" of five percent or more of any class of
"equity securities" registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(l) (2000).
328. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2003) ("A person shall be deemed to be the beneficial owner
of a security ... if that person has the right to acquire beneficial ownership of such security ...
within sixty days, including but not limited to any right to acquire: (A) Through the exercise of
any option, warrant or right.").
329. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000). Interestingly, until recently, Section 16 was the "only provision
in the Federal securities law that explicitly deal[t] with [insider] trading." Fox, supra note 310, at
2202. Section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5, which govern the type of insider trading with which most
people are familiar, arguably do not prohibit insider trading by their literal terms, but only by
judicial construction. It was not until autumn of 2000, when the Commission adopted Rule lOb5-
1, that the Commission's rules first contained the words "insider trading." See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b5-1 (2003).
330. Section 16 was designed "to deter insiders from profiting at the expense of outsiders
through the insiders' access to nonpublic information and to do so without requiring evidence that
such nonpublic information was actually used." See Fox, supra note 310, at 2139.
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for two principal reasons. As noted above, the Commission regards
transactions in SARs as transactions in the "underlying" stock for the
purposes of Section 16. Although the propriety of this treatment has
certainly been controversial in the securities law literature, the fact is
that classifying stock options or SARs as non-securities would have no
significant effect on Section 16. Second, Section 16 is, by its own
terms, only applicable to "officers" and "directors" of the issuer. In the
Section 16 context, the term "officer" refers to the senior-level execu-
tives of the issuer that are called "executive officers" in other securities
law contexts. 331 As discussed above, this article does not deny that such
incentives may in fact constitute "securities." Thus, there is no reason to
believe that the approach taken in this article would in any way impair
the full functioning of the Section 16 short-swing profit provisions.
The duplicative regulatory coverage of employee incentives
described above is important not only from the practical standpoint of
maintaining regulatory continuity but also from the legal perspective of
bolstering the case for non-security treatment. The fourth Reves factor,
the "risk-reducing factor," looks for some protective measure "such as
the existence of another regulatory scheme" to protect the purported
"investor." Unlike the instruments found to be securities in the Reves
case, which "would escape federal regulation entirely if the Acts were
held not to apply," '332 employee stock options continue to be subject to
comprehensive federal regulation even if the Acts do not apply. Moreo-
ver, such comprehensive federal regulation is not merely the substitute
supervision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as was suffi-
cient to supplant the securities laws in Marine Bank. That federal regu-
lation is the very protection of the Securities Acts themselves.
C. Legislative Purpose or "a Broad Federal
Remedy for All Fraud"?
1. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF THE EXCHANGE ACT
The Supreme Court has emphasized that, as expansive as the cover-
age of the securities laws is, "Congress, in enacting the securities laws,
did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud. 33 3 In the
Court's ritualistic invocations of the broad scope of the securities laws, it
still emphasized that the definitions "encompass virtually any instrument
that might be sold as an investment."'3 34 Thus, even in the expansive
331. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-I(f) (2003); see also PETER J. ROMEO & ALAN L. DYE,
COMPREHENSIVE SECTION 16 OUTLINE 37-38 (2001).
332. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 57 (1990).
333. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
334. Reves, 494 U.S. at 61.
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expressions of the legislative scope, the Court recognized that the securi-
ties laws are meant to regulate instruments that might be sold at "invest-
ments." But the broad literal scope of the securities laws, if not
administratively restrained, can extend far beyond that animating pur-
pose. For example, despite the fact that "notes" are literally included in
the definition of a security, in the context of consumer transactions, Pro-
fessor Loss has observed that the personal note given as a down payment
on a television must not be a security, lest "every unsatisfactory picture
tube might end up in federal court . . . as a fraudulent 'purchase' of a
'security."' 335 The same argument applies to the employment incentive
scenario, where expanding securities coverage beyond the context of
bona fide investments runs the risk of converting every employment
squabble, quite literally, into a federal case.
The legislative purpose of the Exchange Act, moreover, is consis-
tent with the notion that employee incentives were not the type of securi-
ties Congress had in mind. Without getting excessively smart alecky,
Section 12(g) is, after all, part of the Securities Exchange Act. That Act,
according to the declaration of necessity for regulation, which precedes
the Exchange Act, was designed to "provide for the regulation and con-
trol" of "transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securi-
ties exchanges and over-the-counter markets," and of "practices and
matters related thereto." '336 The Supreme Court has not only confirmed
this purpose of the Exchange Act,337 but also has reaffirmed the impor-
tance of legislative purpose in interpreting the scope of the securities
laws. In the Joiner case for example, the Court emphasized that "courts
will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating gen-
eral purpose, will read text in light of context, and will interpret the text
so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in
particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy." '338 Even
those commentators who object to construing an act according to its
"general purposes" '3 39 would ostensibly not object to interpreting the
335. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 17, at 934-35.
336. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000).
337. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The 1934 Act was
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of
transactions upon securities exchanges and in the over-the-counter markets."); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975) (holding that the Exchange Act is "chiefly
concerned with the regulation of post-distribution trading on the Nation's stock exchanges and
securities trading markets") (emphasis added).
338. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
339. See, e.g., Rosin, Functional Exclusions, supra note 166, at 336 ("Statutory structure and
the common understanding of statutory language are the best evidence of legislative intent and can
be varied only by unambiguous legislative history, and not by recourse to the statute's general
purposes.").
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statute in accordance with the stated declaration of necessity for regula-
tion. 340  And that "dominating general purpose" or declaration of
"necessity for regulation" of the Exchange Act makes it difficult to
"interpret the text so far" as to include non-tradable, employee incentive
instruments in an Act designed to regulate trading "upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets."
2. THE COMMISSION'S RETREAT FROM REGULATORY
MANIFEST DESTINY
The Commission's regulatory retreat from the employee incentive
field is itself persuasive evidence against treating employee stock
options as securities. Over the past few decades, the Commission has
almost completely eviscerated the Securities Act regulation of employee
benefit transactions. In the context of private companies, the Commis-
sion's Rule 701 allows public offerings and sales for cash to employees
and consultants without registration or prospectus delivery require-
ments.341 In the context of public companies, the Commission allows
registration of compensatory securities transactions on its perfunctory
Form S-8,342 which lacks even the requirement of a filed prospectus, and
consists of little more than a registration statement cover page and
exhibits wrapped around the employee benefit plan itself. Furthermore,
Form S-8 becomes effective immediately upon filing,34 3 obviating SEC
review and comment.
These regulatory reforms of employee incentives in the Securities
Act arena, however, contrast dramatically with the Commission's stem
position on employee stock options in the Exchange Act arena. Recall
that issuers may obtain Section 12(g) relief with respect to employee
stock options on the condition that issuers provide to their option holders
"essentially the same Exchange Act registration statement, annual report
and quarterly report information" as if the options were registered under
12(g). That position contrasts sharply with the position taken by the
340. See, e.g., Rosin, Historical Perspectives, supra note 252, at 590. As discussed supra note
166, Professor Rosin argues for a narrow construction of the "context" clause, arguing that that
clause does not limit the definition of "security" depending on the "transactional context" in
which the purported security appears. See Rosin, Historical Perspectives, supra note 252 at 587-
88. Professor Rosin concedes, however, that the declaration of necessity for regulation supports
the argument that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act should be limited in scope to "market-related
fraud." Id. at 591. He does not, however, appear to believe the "context" clause of the definition
of "security" is an appropriate mechanism to narrow the scope of the Exchange Act generally. It
is not clear why the general statement of Section 2 of the Exchange Act should apply exclusively
to Section 10(b) rather than to the Exchange Act generally, e.g., via the operation of the "context"
clause.
341. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2003).
342. Id. § 239.16b.
343. See id. § 230.462(a).
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Commission when it adopted amendments to Rule 701 only a few years
ago:
[t]he type and amount of disclosure needed in a compensatory securi-
ties transaction differs from that needed in a capital-raising transac-
tion. In a bona fide compensatory arrangement, the issuer is
concerned primarily with compensating the employee-investor rather
than maximizing its proceeds form the sale. Because the compen-
sated individual has some business relationship, perhaps extending
over a long period of time, with the securities issuer, that person will
have acquired some, and in many cases, a substantial amount of
knowledge about the enterprise. The amount and type of disclosure
required for this person is not the same as for the typical investor
with no particular connection with the issuer.34 4
In this Release, the Commission appears to straightforwardly acknowl-
edge that even in securities transactions that involve true investment
decisions,34 5 compensatory employee transactions do not warrant the
same regulatory strictures as capital-raising transactions. In the same
release, the Commission also noted that "[i]t would be an unreasonable
burden to require these private companies, many of which are small
businesses, to incur the expenses and disclosure obligations of public
companies when their only public securities sales were to employees.
Further, these sales are for compensatory and incentive purposes, rather
than for capital-raising. 3 46  The Commission's policy on employee
incentives under the Securities Act stands in stark contrast against its
policy under the Securities Act. The Commission states that the
"expenses and disclosure obligations" of Securities Act registration
would constitute an "unreasonable burden" on private companies in con-
nection with compensatory transactions. The fact is, though, that the
disclosure items required by Form S-1, the basic Securities Act registra-
tion form, are virtually identical to those required by Form 10, the basic
Exchange Act registration form. While a typical issuer focuses dispro-
portionately more attention on preparing a Securities Act registration
statement than Exchange Act registration statements or reports, that dis-
parity reflects the difference in potential liability exposure, not the dif-
ference in the comprehensiveness of the "disclosure obligations."
Therefore, the question should be asked why Securities Act registration,
which is a one-time event, is an "unreasonable burden" on an issuer in
344. Release 7645, supra note 214, at 81,781.
345. Rule 701 is an exception from registration under the Securities Act, and therefore would
only be necessary if an "offer" or "sale" were contemplated. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2002). As
noted earlier, in the context of employee benefit transactions, the concept of an "investment
decision" is a component of a "sale" or the equivalent concept of an "investment." See supra Part
l1.B.2.c.
346. Release 7645, supra note 214, at 81,777.
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terms of "expenses and disclosure obligations," while Exchange Act
reporting, which implicates almost the exact same disclosure items and
which is an ongoing and continuous obligation, is not an "unreasonable
burden"?
347
Therefore, with respect to private companies, the Commission's
position appears to be the following: holders of broad-based employee
stock options who make no "investment" in the options and cannot
transfer them need "essentially the same" Exchange Act disclosure as if
the options were registered under the Exchange Act; on the other hand,
employee purchasers of employer common stock, who actually pay cash
or other "specific consideration" for shares underlying the options,
require a lesser "amount and type of disclosure" than an outside investor
in purchasing those shares.
V. THE 12(G) PROBLEM AND ISSUER RESPONSE
The practical reality of the Commission's position is that the loom-
ing registration ultimatum will force (and has already forced) many pri-
vately held companies to cut back employee incentive programs to avoid
the registration provisions of the Act. Some issuers, of course, may take
the approach articulated above that their broad-based employee stock
options are not "securities," or the narrower approach articulated below
that even if such options are "securities," they are not subject Section
12(g) of the Exchange Act. The more likely response, however, will be
simply to curtail employee incentive plans to avoid the regulatory hassle
of reporting requirements. The current position of the Commission, at
least in its present form, could mean the eradication of truly broad-based
plans from the range of realistic compensation alternatives for privately
held firms.
347. There are two answers that might be given to my rhetorical question, but neither is
convincing in the context of the entire securities regulatory framework. The first potential answer
is that the true "unreasonable burden" of Securities Act registration would be subjection to the
strict-liability provisions of Section II of the Securities Act for material misstatements or
omissions in the offering documents. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2002), which does not attend
Exchange Act registration. This rejoinder may be quickly disposed of, though, with the
Commission's own language; the Commission said that it would be unreasonable to impose "the
expenses and disclosure obligations" of the Securities Act, not the liabilities associated with false
or misleading statements. The second potential answer is that Securities Act registration itself
would necessarily encompass the entrance of the registrant into the system of Exchange Act
reporting, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2002), and that it is the Exchange Act reporting that would be
an "unreasonable burden." To the extent the real answer is based on the second consideration,
however, that answer would, for obvious reasons, apply with equal force to the prospect of
requiring Exchange Act registration directly under Section 12 (g).
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A. Inapplicability of Section 12(g) to Employee Stock Options
This article advances the thesis that certain types of employee stock
options should not be treated as securities for purposes of the Securities
Acts. If stock options do not constitute "securities," then they should
not constitute "equity securities" within the meaning of the Exchange
Act.348 In turn, if the options do not constitute "equity securities," then
the fact that there may be more than five hundred holders thereof will
not trigger the registration and reporting requirements under the
Exchange Act. From a practical perspective, however, issuers must
acknowledge that the Commission is unlikely to embrace arguments that
threaten its regulatory turf, no matter how persuasive. In addition, lower
federal courts, even if persuaded by the merits of the argument, are
likely to accord substantial deference to the judgment of the Commis-
sion. For most issuers, therefore, at least on a prospective basis, the
practical alternatives are limited to those that accept the Commission's
position that all employee stock options are securities.
Even if unwilling to rely on the "non-security" argument, issuers
facing the registration mandate have another, narrower argument for
non-registration that, while perhaps unlikely to prevail upon the Com-
mission, may more readily persuade lower federal courts. As noted ear-
lier,349 Section 12(g) requires issuers with over five hundred record
holders of any class of "equity security" to register with the Commis-
sion. The Commission is of the view that employee stock options are
not only "securities," but also "equity securities" for the purposes of the
Act, and commentators generally accept that view as a general matter
without much serious question.3 50 A stronger argument may be made,
though, that non-transferable employee stock options, even if securities
for the purposes of the Securities Acts generally, are not the "equity
348. The term "equity security" is defined as "any stock or similar security, or any security
future or any security convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying
any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right." 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l 1) (2002). The ordinary stock option would constitute an "equity security" for
two reasons-it would qualify both as a "security convertible ... into such a security" and as a
"warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase" an equity security. Under the approach of this
article, the broad-based employee stock option, however, would not qualify under the first test
because it is not a "security." The employee stock option would not qualify under the second test
because the language "warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase" is the identical language
contained in the definition of "security." Finally, although the definition of "equity security"
empowers the Commission to include other instruments of a "similar nature" in the definition by
rule or regulation, its power is limited to designating as an "equity security" "any other security."
See id. § 3(a)(l 1) (2002).
349. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 310, at 2184 ("An [employee stock option] is clearly an equity
security because it is an option and because Congress has amended the definition of 'equity
security' to include stock options.").
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securities" envisioned by Congress or the Commission for the registra-
tion provisions of Section 12(g).
The evidence for this narrower reading of Section 12(g) derives
from the legislative history of the provision. Section 12(g) was not a
part of the Exchange Act as originally enacted, but was added by the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964.35 l The impetus for those amend-
ments was a Congressional directive to the Commission to make a
review of "the rules governing the securities markets to see whether they
are adequate to protect investors. 352 The Commission dutifully under-
took a Special Study of the Securities Markets in 1961 and, after two
years, recommended (among many other things) eliminating the infor-
mational disparity between exchange-traded securities and securities
traded in the over-the-counter markets.353 The "disparity" resulted from
the fact that, prior to the 1964 Amendments, the registration and report-
ing provisions of the Exchange Act were applicable only to those securi-
ties listed on national securities exchanges and to those issuers that had
made a prior public offering.354 The addition of Section 12(g) was
designed to extend to issuers of securities "traded in over-the-counter
markets" the protections of Section 12, Section 13, Section 14, and Sec-
tion 16 of the Exchange Act.355
The question remained, however, as to how to strike the "balance"
between the Commission's Elysium, where "ideally" registration would
include "every security in which there is a public investor interest," and
the practical reality of limited regulatory resources and significant issuer
burdens.356 As a conceptual matter, the Commission decided to draw
the line between public and private by reference to the degree of "pub-
lic-investor interest" in the relevant issuer's securities.35 ' But without
any ready measure for the "public investor interest," the Commission
recognized that it needed to adopt a "reasonably reliable and easily
351. Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
352. See Pub. L. No. 87-196, 75 Stat. 465 (1961); see also H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 5 (1964).
353. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 60-64 (1963) [hereinafter REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY].
354. According to the Commission, the reason for the prior limited application of the
registration and reporting provisions was that "too little was known about the over-the-counter
market in 1934 to enable Congress feasibly to devise provisions as specific as those relating to
listed securities." Id. at 1.
355. See H.R. REp. No. 88-1418, at 1 (1964). Section 12 of the 1934 Act contains the
requirement that certain issuers register with the Commission by filing an Exchange Act
registration statement. Section 13 requires periodic reports by issuers registered under Section 12.
Section 14 contains the Commission's proxy statement and information statement rules. Section
16 deals with the recovery of "short-swing" trading profits by insiders of an issuer. See supra Part
IV.B.
356. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 354, at 17.
357. Id.
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enforceable" surrogate measure for public investor interest.358 After
considering several possible measures, the Commission ultimately set-
tled on the number-of-shareholders criterion on the basis of the Commis-
sion's belief that there existed "a clear relationship . . . between
shareholders size and the apparent degree of trading activity indicated by
numbers of transfers of record and frequency of broker-dealer quota-
tions. ' 359 Thus, the reason the five hundred record holder measure was
adopted was to approximate "trading activity indicated by numbers of
transfers of record." Since ordinary employee stock options can nor-
mally have no transfers of record, the five hundred record holder rule
loses its purpose as a proxy for the level of trading activity.
The rationale behind the five hundred record holder threshold, as
described above, helps to illustrate why Section 12(g) should have no
application to instruments such as employee stock options. The Com-
mission's intent in proposing the Amendments was to extend "the com-
prehensive scheme of disclosure" of the Exchange Act to protect
"investors . . . in the over-the-counter market. '360 The Commission's
analysis of the "public-investor interest" above reveals the market the
Commission was targeting: markets with "trading activity" evidenced by
"numbers of transfers of record and frequency of broker-dealer quota-
tions." None of these rationales could possibly encompass securities
such as employee stock options that are, by their own terms, non-trans-
ferable. This intuition is borne out by practically every contemporane-
ous piece of legislative history pertaining to the Amendment, which
describe the Amendments as applying to "publicly traded securities"' 36'
and "issuers of securities traded in the over-the-counter markets."36
Reading a section designed to regulate "publicly traded securities" in the
"over-the-counter markets" as encompassing instruments that cannot be
traded, over-the-counter or otherwise, would violate the unambiguous
intent of Congress.
The solution to the Commission's Section 12(g) interpretive prob-
lem is the context clause that precedes all of the statutory definitions in
Section 3 of the Exchange Act. According to the Supreme Court, this
context clause means that "the same words may take on a different col-
oration in different sections of the securities laws. 363 When interpret-
ing the meaning of terms in the Securities Acts, the "purpose," along
with the "language" and "history" of the relevant statutes, is relevant in
358. Id.
359. Id. at 61-62.
360. See S. REP. No. 88-379, at 9 (1963).
361. See, e.g., id.; H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 1 (1964).
362. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 88-379, at 60 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 2, 15 (1964).
363. SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
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deciding whether to override an administrative agency's interpreta-
tion.3 64 Therefore, while the Commission may interpret the term "equity
security" in Section 12(g) to include employee stock options, and while
that interpretation is entitled to "considerable weight," courts are not
constrained to interpret the term as broadly in the context of Section
12(g) as in the context of other provisions of the Act. Instead, the "dif-
ferent coloration" of the term "equity security" in Section 12(g), "must
be understood against the backdrop of what Congress was attempting to
accomplish in enacting the Securities Acts. 365
What Congress was "attempting to accomplish" in the 1964
Amendments is plain from the expressed purpose of the bill itself; the
purpose was "[t]o extend disclosure requirements to the issuers of addi-
tional publicly traded securities. '36 6 The Commission adopted a virtu-
ally identical view of the Amendments' objectives in a contemporaneous
"summary analysis" of those Amendments, where the Commission
described one of the "major objectives" of the Amendments as affording
information to "investors in publicly-held companies whose securities
are traded over-the-counter. '367 Few would argue that non-transferable
stock options are even "traded," much less "publicly traded." Nor
would many people argue that such options are part of the "over-the-
counter market"; after all, the very term "over-the-counter" is descrip-
tive of the act of exchange.368 No reasonable construction of Section
12(g) that gives consideration to the clear Congressional purpose could
favor a registration requirement under Section 12(g) for non-transferable
employee stock options.
This narrower version of Section 12(g), when properly articulated,
should satisfy, or at least persuade, even the literalist commentators.
Even in the Commission's "ideal" scenario, requiring registration of any
security with a "public investor interest," non-transferable options still
would not qualify, at least according to the Commission's definition of
"public investor interest. ' 369 As illustrated above, extension of Section
12(g) to cover non-transferable employee stock options would be anti-
thetical to the Commission's own expression of the purpose of the
Amendments. Thus, the purpose-oriented approach would also seem to
364. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979).
365. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 (1990).
366. Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (emphasis added).
367. See Securities Act Release No. 4725 (CCH) at 82,099 (2002).
368. Black's Law Dictionary defines the "over-the-counter market" as "the market for
securities that are not traded on an organized exchange. OTC trading usually occurs through
telephone or computer negotiations between buyers and sellers. Many of the more actively traded
OTC stocks are listed on NASDAQ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (7th ed. 1999).
369. See supra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
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satisfy even the "facial interpretation" advocates who would limit the
"context" clause to a "focus on the intent of a specific provision."370
Professor Rosin, for example, would seem to agree that even literalist
courts are willing to bend the letter of the law when "there is a specific,
unambiguous expression of legislative intent to the contrary. '371' And
Professor Steinberg, while arguing for the irrelevance of "factual cir-
cumstances" surrounding a transaction, concedes that statutory text must
yield when "the language, structure, or legislative history ... warrants a
different meaning." '372 Congress has provided sufficient specific, unam-
biguous expression of intent that even quasi-literalists should reject the
applicability of Section 12(g) to employee stock options.
B. Industry Reaction to the Section 12(g) Issue
Companies faced with the 12(g) registration mandate have limited
alternatives if they wish to continue employee incentive policies that
would trigger Section 12(g). They may register their options under Sec-
tion 12(g), beg for the Commission's exemptive relief from Section
12(g), or challenge the Commission's position on the applicability of
Section 12(g). The first option would simply be unworkable from the
perspective of most companies. The second option has already been
described. Thus, as a practical matter, companies that wish to continue
their broad-based compensation policies without complying with the
Commission's conditions are left to the alternative of risking a potential
challenge from the Commission or a disgruntled employee.
The prospect of engaging the Commission in a regulatory struggle
is understandably unpalatable. The courts are likely to offer the Com-
mission's interpretation "considerable weight"373 and the risk of
enforcement proceedings or litigation is likely to sufficiently intimidate
most companies. The securities law community, moreover, has become
so accustomed to the literal approach that in spite of the Supreme
Court's guidance the momentum of the community is consciously and
unconsciously driven by custom more than innovation.
The Introduction to this article noted that the Commission has indi-
cated its willingness to extend no-action relief from the requirements of
Section 12(g), provided issuers meet the Commission's conditions.
370. Rosin, Functional Exclusions, supra note 166, at 361. Professor Rosin describes his
"facial interpretation" approach as one that "relies on legislative intent and purpose, but does so in
a more focused manner than functional exclusion analysis. While the latter approach relies
heavily on the legislature's overall concern, facial interpretation looks to the purpose or policy
reflected in the specific provision in question." Id. at 360.
371. Id. at 341.
372. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 17, at 505.
373. See United States v. Nat'l Assn. of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975).
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Already, a number of companies have formally requested no-action
relief from the Commission with respect to their employee stock
options.3 74 But those companies that have already crossed the five hun-
dred holder mark may need to develop some more active approach to
managing their 12(g) option threshold. One approach would be to wait
for option holders to exercise their options or to use a variety of tech-
niques to encourage option holders to exercise their options prema-
turely.3 7' Because an option to acquire common stock is generally not
considered the same class of equity security as the common stock, the
company could, by shifting people out of its options and into its more
closely held common stock, keep both under five hundred. There is, of
course, a limit to this strategy, as the number of holders of common
stock could then also surpass five hundred. Nevertheless, a substantial
portion of option holders likely will immediately sell the stock they
acquire on exercise (if practicable),3 76 and that effect plus the additional
five hundred holder buffer will help many firms. Finally, some firms
may try to further shave the numbers of outstanding options holders by
taking the position that unvested employee stock options do not consti-
tute "warrants" or "rights" to acquire securities.37 7
The specific approach that will gain industry currency in response
to the broad-based employee incentive problem is still unclear. What is
clear, however, is that the approaches outlined above are, at best, band-
aid solutions for a regulatory hemorrhage. Once this problem becomes
more well known, the regulatory position will create a number of nega-
tive effects on rank-and-file workers. The first is that employers will
contract the scope of employees eligible for their stock options, whether
prospectively or retroactively, whether explicitly or pretextually. In fact,
374. See, e.g., Gen-Probe Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 15, 2001) 2001 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 694; AMIS Holdings, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (July 30, 2001) 2001 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 673; Mitchell Int'l Holding, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 27, 2000) 2000 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 1033; Gen. Roofing Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (April 13, 2000) 2000 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 496; Kinko's, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 30, 1999) 1999 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 928; Millennium Pharm., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (May 21, 1998) 1998 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 604.
375. Exercise of an option prior to expiration is normally not optimal, even when the option is
"in the money." See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 532 (1999).
Early exercise can be optimal, though, if the underlying stock pays dividends. Moreover, the
higher the dividends, the more likely early exercise is optimal. Nevertheless, the success of this
technique would depend on the antidilution provisions contained in the stock option plan.
376. See Chip Heath et al., Psychological Factors and Stock Option Exercise, 114 Q.J. ECON.
601, 606 (1999) ("[Tlhe great majority of option-holders immediately sell the stock acquired on
exercise."); see also Fox, supra note 310, at 2162 ("Any exercise prior to the expiration of the
calls is simply the satisfaction of a necessary precondition for the sale of shares that will
inevitably follow immediately thereafter.").
377. Because unvested employee stock options are not exercisable and may never become
exercisable, it is conceivable that they may not constitute a present "right" to acquire a security.
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some well-advised employers who are aware of the incentive problem
are already responding to the Commission's ultimatum by reducing their
present employee incentive programs or by constraining the growth of
future incentives. The second result of the Commission's position is that
those reductions will disproportionately affect the lower echelons of the
corporate contingent. Thus, by the Commission's mechanical approach
to the Exchange Act, stock options in private companies may once again
become the exclusive privilege of more highly compensated key
employees.
VI. CONCLUSION
The securities laws have historically been interpreted using the
principle of economic reality to avoid the perils of an overly constrictive
literalistic reading. The same principle, however, has traditionally been
unavailable to avoid the perils of an overly expansive literalistic reading.
The lower courts have ritualistically invoked the "remedial" nature of
the securities laws in refusing to restrict the literal scope of the securities
laws by principles of economic reality or even by the ratio legis. The
Supreme Court reaction, in the form of the Marine Bank and Reves
cases, stressed that in fact economic reality can contract as well as
expand the scope of the securities laws, providing a counterweight to the
heavy inclusionary bias exerted by Howey. While Reves is a weak deci-
sion from a theoretical standpoint and injects a degree of incremental
ambiguity into an already murky area, the contextual approach embraced
by Reves does provide a basis for avoiding certain undesirable regula-
tory excesses, like the ones identified herein.
The analytical relationship between notes and employee stock
options described in this article also holds a certain historical interest,
having been identified by Professor Loss over thirty years ago. In the
1968 supplement to his influential securities law treatise, Professor Loss
noted that it was "arguable" that options given for personal services, like
private promissory notes, should be treated as non-securities.378 Not
only did Professor Loss identify the analogy between promissory notes
and employee stock options two decades before the Reves decision, but
he did so at a time when notes were widely regarded as almost per se
378. See Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 2494 (Supp. 1969) ("It is still arguable, as in
the case of the ordinary promissory note given to a bank or another private lender, that a
nontransferable option that is incident to a contract for personal services is not a 'security' for the
purposes of the fraud provisions of the 1933 Act."). Professor Loss, in fact, had suggested the
possible non-security character of such options even before the 1969 supplement. See Louis
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (lst ed. 1951); Loss, supra note 118, at 467 ("The administrative
construction is that an option which is incident to a contract for personal services may not be a
security.").
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securities,3 79 just as employee stock options are today. Over time, the
courts ultimately came to acknowledge that many types of notes are not
securities, based on their commercial or consumer rather than invest-
ment, character. 380 The future of employee equity participation in pri-
vately held companies will depend, at least in part, on the courts'
willingness to acknowledge the same with respect to employee stock
options.
379. See Chang, supra note 147, at 410-11; see also Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Cent. Nat'l
Bank, 409 F.2d 989, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that the "definition of a security has been
literally read by the judiciary to the extent that almost all notes are held to be securities").
380. See Rosin, Functional Exclusions, supra note 166, at 338 ("The concept of functional
exclusion of certain promissory notes is now generally accepted by the lower federal courts."); see
also Martin Lipton & George A. Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29
Bus. LAW. 861 (1974); Martin Lipton & George A. Katz, "Notes" Are Not Always Securities, 30
Bus. LAW. 763 (1975).
